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This dissertation consists of three essays that provide empirical evidence on the importance of 
institutions, informal institutions and particularly religion in economic development. In the first 
chapter, the relationship between religious adherence rate in the U.S. counties and 
entrepreneurship is examined. After controlling for spatial dependencies, results indicate that 
more religious counties, meaning counties with higher rate of religious membership, have lower 
entrepreneurial potentials. Chapter 2 investigates the relevance of institutional quality in 
efficiency of public spending. This study is delivered in the state level. By using a non-
parametric method, efficiency of public spending is calculated and then its relationship with 
some indicators of institutional quality is tested. It is shown that states with better judicial system 
and less restrictive labor market present more effective public spending.  In the last chapter the 
role of state religiosity in the political and societal conflict is studied. The hypothesis states that 
if a country has a religious government, the chance and magnitude of having a domestic conflict 
due to religious heterogeneity would increase. After controlling for several covariates, there is 
not enough evidence found to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore religious heterogeneity in 
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In studies on economic development, a large literature has been accumulated on the topic of 
institutions in recent decades. Douglass North gives a general definition for institutions as ―rules 
of the game‖ that shape human interactions. They are humanly devised constraints that affect 
interactions between people. Changing these constraints affects people‘s incentives and, 
therefore, affects economic, political, and social outcomes. Studying institutional arrangements 
helps to shed some light on why there is a high variation of the level of economic development 
across economies. There is a growing number of studies focusing on this particular aspect of 
institutions. Some of them conclude that institutions are among the most important factors 
explaining the differences in economic performance, e.g. Acemoglu, Johsnon and Robisnon 
(2001). But some claim that institutions are more of the outcome of policies, and some other 
factors such as human capital have more priority in the analysis, e.g. Glaeser, La Porta and 
Shleifer (2004). Overall based on this literature, we can confidently state that institutions matter 
in many different aspects of development. 
 The ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the empirical evidence on the 
importance of institutions in development and to shed light on particular channels through which 
this connection improves. To this end, in two chapters I specifically concentrate on one informal 
institution, religion, and in the other essay I examine the relationship between institutional 
quality and government performance in local level. 
 Studying informal institutions, such as culture, social norms and religion have been 
attracting attention in sociology, political science and recently in economics. Religion, taken as 
one important variable in socio-economic performance, is related to economic development 
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through very diverse channels. In the two chapters of this dissertation, I try to contribute to areas 
of entrepreneurship and political stability and their connection to religion. Another area of 
studies in this dissertation is the relationship between quality of institutions and efficiency of 
governments. In what follows, I introduce the three essays and briefly present their main findings 
and contributions. 
 
1.1 Religion and Entrepreneurship: A County-level Analysis 
There is a growing consensus that religion plays an important role in various social and 
economic outcomes, yet little is known about specific mechanisms and channels through which 
religion affects economic development. Theoretical studies on this topic can be dated back to 
Max Weber‘s seminal work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. More recent 
studies, particularly empirical ones, focus on growth and social outcomes (e.g. Barro and 
McCleary, 2003). One key component of development, left out from the literature of economics 
of religion, is entrepreneurship. It is believed by many scholars that entrepreneurship and what 
entrepreneurs do is essential for dynamic and sustainable economic growth and development. 
This essay examines whether level of entrepreneurship across the U.S. counties can be 
explained by religiosity and religious diversity. The underlying goal is to investigate if faith and 
religious practice of individuals impact their entrepreneurial behavior. Very few studies look into 
this particular channel through which religion and economic performance can be connected. 
Dodd and Gotsis (2007) examine a similar question using some micro-level survey-based 
dataset. But in this paper, I try to consider the aggregated county-level data and focus more on 
the collective entrepreneurial potential of people in communities rather than individual level.  
Entrepreneurship can be viewed from completely different perspectives. In this chapter, 
two different variables are constructed to proxy what can partially capture entrepreneurial 
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potential in county level. It is stated ―partially‖, because coming up with one single measure 
showing the entrepreneurship of a society or a locality is quite an impossible task to accomplish. 
That is why the two measures are considered to tackle different aspects of the dependent 
variable. They are the share of self-employment in the total employment, and the annual growth 
rate of small firms in each county.  
Religious adherence rates for each county are used as a measure of religiosity level, and 
religious diversity is calculated considering five main religious denominations: Catholics, 
Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Orthodox and the others. These variables are taken 
and constructed from Religious Congregations and Membership Studies.
1
  
After considering spatial dependencies among counties, by employing spatial 
econometric methods, results indicate that religious factors are not beneficial for 
entrepreneurship within the borders of a county. But they positively affect neighboring localities‘ 
entrepreneurial potential. Also there is a small variation of effects among different 
denominations. This paper contributes to the literature of economics of religion in two ways. 
First, relationship between religion and entrepreneurship has not been investigated for this level 
of study in previous research. Second, including spatial modeling in this literature can help 
understand the mechanism by which religion can impact behavior and eventually economic 
output. This aspect has been neglected from previous studies as well. 
1.2 Institutional Quality and Efficiency of Public Spending: Evidence from the U.S. 
State Governments 
It is often perceived by many government officials that higher GDP per capita and more income 
equality are favorable for the economy. Scholars from different school of thoughts also assume 
balanced policies toward growth and equality would result in more stable development process. 
                                                          
1
 It is organized and conducted by Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA). 
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To reach these two goals, different policies can be implemented. Fiscal tools, such as public 
spending may have a significant effect on economic growth and income distribution. There is 
important evidence in the real world, and that is the remarkable variation across economies in the 
effectiveness of their public expenditure. The second chapter of the dissertation focuses on this 
aspect of public spending and its relationship with institutions. Particularly the impact of some 
institutional quality measures on effectiveness of public spending for governments of the 50 
states in the U.S is examined. 
Basically the question is if better institutions would promote higher efficiency of public 
spending. The efficiency particularly is measured regarding how much growth and equality 
simultaneously can be achieved given a certain level of public spending. For this purpose a 
nonparametric method, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), is employed to calculate the 
efficiency.  
There are three major venues for comparing institutional quality which are considered: 
judicial system, labor market and political affiliation. In these areas, there is not a large variation 
among states in the U.S (as compared to cross country comparisons). Nonetheless we still can 
observe the differences in performance of judiciaries and also structure of labor markets. 
Moreover political preferences are varied among states. On the other side we see variation 
among states‘ public spending efficiencies. Arizona and Idaho seem to have the most efficient 
public spending while Alaska and Wyoming are among the least efficient ones. The ultimate 
goal here would be to investigate if these variations in effectiveness can be explained by level 
institutional qualities. The overall findings confirm that better judicial system and less regulation 
in the labor market enhance effectiveness of state governments.  
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1.3 Religious Heterogeneity, State Religiosity and Conflict 
Secularization theory prior to the 1980‘s was the dominant paradigm among social scientists 
(Nordas, 2004). This theory claims as societies become industrialized and generally modernized, 
political power of religion would fade away. However there are multiple real world examples 
that challenge and negate this theory as there have been states with religion at the core of their 
constitution and political existence. Gill and Keshavarzian (1999) show that old line 
secularization theory is not supported by empirical evidence. Religious organizations and leaders 
have become more politically active and in some cases they have been able to have direct impact 
on the policy decision making levels in the government. Therefore religion is one important topic 
when we study the social and political status of countries. 
 Besides this issue, observation from around the world reveals that in most of the 
countries, population demographics have become more diverse. This can be due to several 
reasons including immigration. Along with this increasing social heterogeneity, religious 
fractionalization would increase as well. Social heterogeneity for so many years has been one 
issue studied by social scientists as one factor relevant to challenges of societal and political 
stability. Basically there are studies that claim as societies become more diverse, e.g. higher 
religious diversity; the probability of political instability due to confrontation of different groups 
would increase. One typical representation of social/political instability is violent conflict, e.g. 
civil war. 
In this chapter, I want to connect these two topics and examine two hypotheses regarding 
the relationship between religion and conflict. The first hypothesis presents the question of 
whether countries with higher religious heterogeneity face higher risk and magnitude of conflict. 
The idea of social heterogeneity, i.e. ethno-lingual or cultural diversity, has been studied 
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extensively in the conflict literature. However there are a limited number of studies focusing on 
religious heterogeneity.  
The second hypothesis, which is the main contribution to the literature, includes the role 
of the state. It investigates whether having a religious government affects the relationship 
between heterogeneity of society and its propensity to have political violent conflict. Measuring 
the religiosity of the state is a challenge. I rely on the constitutional framework of countries and 
also the regulations toward religious groups and activities. Data from the Religion and State 
project (RAS) is extensively used here.  
After offering two different ways of measuring religious heterogeneity and state 
religiosity, by controlling for some key covariates, results confirm that the religiosity of state in 
heterogeneous societies can be a catalyst for conflict. It means that in countries with religious 












Religion and Entrepreneurship: A County-level Analysis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The teachings of most of religions have general or detailed rules and frameworks for different 
aspects of the adherents‘ lives, including the economic aspect. In the religious texts of different 
faiths there are several sets of rules that regulate ―right‖ and ―wrong‖ behavior. Besides 
teachings and rules, religion as an informal institution in any society, directly or indirectly affect 
economic output through various social channels.  For example creation of networks around 
religious groups impacts members‘ behavior. If an individual is a member of a religious group 
and therefore a part of a network, information and resources availability for them would be 
different. So in the aggregate level this one particular dimension of religion will affect behaviors 
and in general changes the rule of game.  
This paper investigates the relationship between religious factors and one dimension of 
economic behavior of individuals. Particularly entrepreneurial behavior is the matter of concern 
here. Putting in short form, I want to test if religiosity and religious diversity have any effect on 
the level of entrepreneurship. The analysis is for the counties in the U.S. 
There is only a small number of studies that investigates a similar question. But they are 
all in a different scale or implementing different variables. Anderson et al. (2000) explores the 
role of religion in the formation of enterprise culture in Britain during the 1980s. Their finding 
shows that despite the confrontation of the Church and economic conventional view back in 
1980s, religion supported the entrepreneurial culture. Dodd and Gotsis (2007) look into the same 
relationship using survey data in the U.S.  Audretsch et al. (2007) examines the influence of 
different religions on propensity to become an entrepreneur in India. Using individual level 
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survey data, they find Christians and Muslims tend to present higher propensity to become 
entrepreneur, as opposed to Buddhists and Hindus. Carswell and Rolland (2007) approach a 
similar question as the current paper and use survey data in New Zealand. They show that the 
increase in the religiosity and religious diversity of New Zealand society has not affected 
entrepreneurship negatively. 
The study of religion in the realm of social sciences, particularly modern economics, is 
relatively a new phenomenon. However some claim Weber‘s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, written in 1905, was the first to identify economic role of faith. Iannaccone (1998) 
even argues that Adam Smith was the one who started the modern study of economics of 
religion. Anderson (1988) investigates the aspects of Wealth of Nations in which the economics 
of religion is highlighted. In any case, the importance of religion as an informal institution in 
different parts of social lives of individuals has been attracting attention of economists for a 
while. This increase in research examining the economic functions of religion was accompanied 
by a new trend in quantitative studies.  These studies started to grow rapidly after a paper titled 
―Religion and Economic Growth‖ by Barro and McCleary in 2003.  The authors analyze the 
influence of religious participation and beliefs on a country‘s rate of economic growth. They find 
that some aspects of beliefs, i.e. belief in heaven and hell, are positively associated with 
economic growth while religious service attendance negatively impacts the growth.  
The current paper is trying to seek out a slightly different part of religiosity‘s importance. 
Entrepreneurship is increasingly being recognized as a primary engine of economic growth and 
development. What entrepreneurs do is crucial to the dynamics of any society by which they 
combine the existing resources and innovative ideas to create new economic goods and services 
and ultimately new jobs. In short, entrepreneurs are the link between the new ideas and economic 
growth and development. Do the faith and religious practice of people affect their entrepreneurial 
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behavior? Is there any connection between the level of religiosity and the entrepreneurial 
activities? Logically at the beginning we need to define these two concepts, entrepreneurship and 
religiosity. Secondly, this question can be answered or analyzed at different layers. For example 
at one level, the story can be the relationship between religious values of an individual and his 
creative and innovative character. So it would be an absolute micro level analysis that can be 
very well categorized in other field of social or human sciences. On another level, we can look at 
these questions, in an aggregated level of a group of individuals. Here, rather than micro 
analysis, I am interested in examining the topic at the social level. In other words, I want to 
examine if the importance of religion in a society has any effect on entrepreneurial behavior of 
members of that society and ultimately the level of entrepreneurship. 
Besides the ultimate objective of this paper which is to investigate the relationship 
between religious factors and entrepreneurship, the spatial behaviors of these variables are 
examined as well. By that, I am referring to the impact of entrepreneurship and religious factors 
in one county on entrepreneurship level of the neighboring counties.  For measuring religiosity, 
like some previous studies, data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) is 
utilized. This is from Religious Congregations and Membership Study in year 2000. 
2
 
The contributions of this paper can be summarized in different parts. First, the research 
question of this paper for the scale of counties in the U.S has not been investigated before. So it 
is a new dimension to be added to the literature of economics of religion in the scale of regional 
studies.  Second, the argument of spatial dependence and spatial behavior, to the knowledge of 
author is a new approach in the literature of both entrepreneurship and economics of religion. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will be a literature review. 
Section 3 consists of a theoretical argument and states the hypotheses of the paper. Section 4 
                                                          
2
 The data is collected by Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies and is available on the 
Association of Religion Data Archives website:  www.TheARDA.com. 
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describes the data and the variables. Model and specification are presented in section 5 followed 
by empirical results and finally the conclusion. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The consensus of the studies in the literature of economics of religion is; it is likely that religion 
affects economic performance and this impact happens through different yet highly related 
channels. One channel is the essence of religious teaching and principles.  
Anderson (1988) refers to Adam Smith‘s Theory of Moral Sentiments and points out that 
religious belief provides strong incentives to follow moral restraints such as trust, honesty, 
benevolence, and restraint from violence that have an effect on civil society. Iannaccone (1995) 
points out that all religions work to instill certain values, morals, and behavioral frameworks in 
their followers and these values, beliefs, and morals are recognized in most aspects of human 
behavior. Another similar argument is that the belief or the fear of God leads adherents to abide 
by ―a kind of internal moral enforcement mechanism‖ (Anderson, 1988, p. 1069). This is what 
sometime is referred to as ―supernatural monitoring‖ or ―God is watching you‖, which leads 
adherents to be trustworthy, truthful, honest, and ethical (Innacconne, 1995; Anderson and 
Tollison, 1992). Berggren (1997) claims religious people are discouraged from engaging in 
activities such as divorce, abortion, non-payment of debt, and illegitimate births, treating these 
activities as sinful. All of these indirectly point to the effects that belief in the religions‘ 
principles would have on the behavior and ultimately on the economic activity and performance. 
A similar literature has documented the importance of religion on economic and social outcomes 
in the US. Lipford et al. (1993) study the impact of church membership (using US state level 
data) on abortion, divorce, murder, illegitimate births and crime and find that church attendance 
has a negative effect on most of these variables. 
 Another part of the literature emphasizes the idea of social interaction and social 
networks. Membership in a religious group would lead to the formation of a network. This 
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network can be the source of accumulation of what is called ―social capital‖. There are studies 
that show higher religious adherence also leads to higher social capital in a community or 
locality. Putnam (1993) argues that trust, and therefore social capital, is higher in societies that 
have dense networks of civic engagement. These networks include neighborhood associations, 
sports clubs, choral societies, and political parties. Religious institutions and religious service 
attendance are often cited as sources of social capital as well (Putnam, 2000; Smidt, 1999; 
Greeley, 1997; Wuthnow, 1997; Tolbert et al., 1998). This form of capital has been viewed as a 
vehicle for improving individuals‘ well-being and for discouraging free riding and shirking. 
Several papers examine the effect of religion on human capital and income (Fan, 2008; Sander, 
2002; Steen, 1996; Tomes, 1984). [See Appendix for the summary of their results] 
  An alternative analysis to the above is that religious adherence or participation requires 
additional resources (e.g. time) (Barro and McCleary, 2003) and this leads to a negative 
relationship between religious activities and economic growth. Some other studies put this in the 
form of opportunity cost of time in the individual level decision making indicating that higher 
rate of attendance  increases the opportunity cost (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975; Lipford and 
Tollison, 2003).  
Heath et al. (1995) study the effects of religion on the level of income using the U.S. state 
level data. More importantly, they analyze the effects of various denominations categorized as 
Jewish, Catholic, liberal and fundamentalist Protestant and find that Jewish membership is 
positively associated with state per capita income, liberal Protestantism is not associated with 
state per capita income and Catholicism and fundamentalist Protestantism are inversely 
associated with state per capita income. Crain and Lee (1999) examine the relation between 
church membership and per capita income growth in state-level in the U.S. and find no evidence 
of significant effect.  
12 
 
Religious diversity or polarization has also received attention in this literature 
(Montalvoa and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Lipford and Tollison, 2003). 
The original argument dating back to Adam Smith is that established (one state-funded and 
protected monopoly) churches tend not to be successful in enforcing the moral virtues of 
followers (Hull and Bold, 1998). In other words, greater diversity of religion in a country or 
region promotes higher competition resulting in higher quality religion (Barro and McCleary, 
2003). Iannaccone (1998) cites empirical evidence to support Smith‘s claim that concentrated 
religious markets result in lower levels of religious participation. An underlying point related to 
present research is that a monopolized religious market may contribute to negative economic 
growth. Hull and Bold (1998) argue that empirical findings to support Smith‘s claim may not be 
applicable to the US since competition between established and non-established churches is not 
comparable to competition among non-established churches, even if concentration is high in a 
market of non-established churches. A related argument is that religious fractionalization, similar 
to ethnic fractionalization, has a negative effect on economic development. From a social capital 
perspective, religiously fragmented societies have less social capital, leading to less-trusting 
societies. An alternative point of view is that greater diversity in the form of a ―melting pot‖ 
(Florida, 2002) can enhance economic well-being in a society.  
The other part of the related literature to the current research includes various studies 
examining entrepreneurship. Since entrepreneurship is a multidimensional concept and there is 
no general agreement on an economic theory of entrepreneurship, previous studies have defined 
and used the term in different ways. Beginning with Schumpeter (1934) an ―entrepreneur‖ is an 
individual with innovative ideas, utilizing new combinations of means of production. Kirzner 
(1979) emphasized the entrepreneur as an enthusiast in discovering opportunities to make profit. 
Knight (1921) and Schultz (1980) described an entrepreneur as an individual who is willing to 
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take risks in performing economic functions, while others (Hagen, 1960; McClelland, 1965; 
Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979) argued that an entrepreneur is a person with certain unique 
psychological characteristics. Although these concepts have contributed greatly to the 
understanding of entrepreneurship, a universally accepted explanation or measure of the concept 
has not yet been found. Hence, previous studies have used different concepts according to the 
purpose of the study, the theory applied, and the availability of information needed for empirical 
research.  
Acs et al. (2005) used start-ups of new firms as a measure of entrepreneurship that 
facilitates spillover of knowledge. This is based on the theory of endogenous growth where 
knowledge was added as a factor explaining economic growth aside from the traditional factors 
of production, capital, and labor. Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) introduced the concept of 
entrepreneurship capital, referring to the society‘s capacity to create entrepreneurial activity 
specifically to generate new firms. They hypothesized that a region with more entrepreneurship 
capital shows a better economic performance. This is based on the theory of entrepreneurship 
serving as a mechanism to transform knowledge spillovers to economic growth. 
 A section in this literature that is highly related to the rationale of this paper is the role 
and function of social networks in promoting entrepreneurship. Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) 
introduced a model that identifies entrepreneurship as embodied in a network of continuing 
social relations. This network facilitates or constrains the linkage between aspiring 
entrepreneurs, resources and opportunities. This framework is different from the traditional 
model which assumed entrepreneurship as a highly personality-based concept. Dubini and 
Aldrich (1991) expand the arguments to different subsections of the network: organizational and 
informal.  They argue that there is a coexistence and coordination between the two networks in 
order to promote and facilitate the entrepreneur‘s activities. Greve and Salaff (2003) study the 
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network activities of entrepreneurs and claim that in different stages of starting a business, 
entrepreneurs establish different networks. Overall the literature on entrepreneurship and 
network effects has been expanding and the general conclusion supports the significant positive 
effect of networking on expansion of entrepreneurial activities. 
2.3 Theoretical Argument 
The association between religion and the level of entrepreneurial activity can be looked into from 
different angles. In this paper both religious factors and entrepreneurship are aggregated for the 
county level analysis. Therefore although the theoretical reasoning behind the empirical study is 
based on individual behavior analysis, the result should be discussed and adjusted in the 
aggregate level.   
As mentioned in previous sections, religions provide moral and ethical foundation for 
their adherents encouraging them to behave in a specific way. Thereby economic behavior might 
be directly influenced by the impact on traits and attitudes, and indirectly by promoting factors 
which themselves influence economic outcomes (Barro, 2003). Also, religion may influence 
economic results through its institutional sources. Public commitment to a religious organization, 
like attending religious services, signals the acceptance of a certain code of conduct. This creates 
incentives among possible transaction partners to use religion as a signal for specific 
characteristics of a person (Tomes, 1984). Furthermore being a part of a network would impact 
the intensity and level of economic behavior. In particular, when we are looking at the 
entrepreneurial activity, the concept of social interaction and network effect would be more 
important. Basically the hypothetical claim is that, people would be affected by being a religious 
adherent or a member of a religious denomination, through two channels: first, based on the 
teaching of the religion and second under the influence of the socio-religious network that they 
are a part of.   Although both of the two venues of impact seem strong and relevant, yet 
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expecting a particular sign or significance for the relationship between religiosity and 
entrepreneurship is difficult. 
The other religious factor that is included in the analysis is the religious fractionalization. 
As discussed in the literature review section, social, cultural and religious diversity have impacts 
on different economic parameters. Entrepreneurship level, if we can define it in the general form 
as the density of innovative activities in one locality, can effect and be affected by religious 
plurality. The idea is that as the society gets more diverse, it becomes a better platform for 
different enterprise plans to grow. At the same time possibly we can claim that entrepreneurs 
would be attracted to more diverse societies so they can start up their business with a hope of 
having more chance to expand due to the diverse market they have. On the other hand, along 
with the literature of fractionalization, religious diversity can negatively affect the economic 
performance. The rationale behind this claim mainly originated from the idea of increasing 
probability of conflict or instability due to ethno-lingual or religious fractionalization (Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2006). This line of reasoning is 
more valid when we are focusing on national level rather than the small community analysis. 
Therefore, overall for the current paper it is expected to have a positive correlation between 
religious diversity and entrepreneurship. 
For the dependent variable, entrepreneurship, there are three main categories of theories: 
personality theories, economic rationality theories and sociocultural theories. In personality 
theory, the psychological and special personal traits are the main force that makes individuals 
prone to behaving as entrepreneurs (Brockhaus, 1982). Economic rational theory considers 
entrepreneurs as rational agents who scan the market and choose the niche that will help them to 
maximize their return. Finally the sociocultural theories posit the propensity to entrepreneurship 
based on nationality, race, culture and religion (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). In reality 
16 
 
entrepreneurship is a mixed result of all these ideas which are highly related to each other. In this 
paper the two economic and sociocultural theories are more emphasized.  
The general hypothesis is that, there is a significant relationship between religious factors 
and entrepreneurship in counties of the U.S. In other words, religiosity and religious diversity are 
significant explanatory variables for entrepreneurial potential. By the theoretical basis presented 
here, I expect to see a positive effect of religious diversity on entrepreneurship; however sign of 
religiosity coefficient seems unclear. Besides this part of hypothesis, the paper investigates the 
spatial behavior of the main variables as well. Basically I propose two questions: does 
entrepreneurship in one county have any impact on entrepreneurship in the neighboring 
counties? Also, do religious factors in one county affect the entrepreneurship in neighbors? 
Why should there be such spatial relation to begin with? The broad answer to this 
question is, in analyzing social or economic variables in small scale, e.g. counties; spatial 
dependence is an inevitable fact. Only in the labor section we can discuss that there are different 
types of mobilities that make the analysis more complicated. There are residences of one county 
who may go to a church which is located in the neighboring county or they may work in another 
county. All these mobilities cause a realistic suspicion toward spatial dependence.  
2.4 Variables and Data 
Measuring entrepreneurship and religiosity is a critical task to accomplish as in the literature 
there is no consensus on the approaches. This problem comes down to the single issue of how to 
define each of the two concepts. In this section the definition and the variables employed in the 
paper are described. 
As explained in the theoretical section, entrepreneurship can be viewed from completely 
different perspectives. Here in this paper, two different variables are constructed to proxy what 
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can partially capture entrepreneurial potential at the county level. It is stated ―partially‖, because 
coming up with one single measure showing the entrepreneurship of a society or a locality is 
quite an impossible task to accomplish. That is why the two measures are considered to tackle 
different aspects of the dependent concept (entrepreneurship). 
Religiosity also, as the main religious factor included in the paper, is difficult to quantify. 
There are different measured used in the literature as proxy for this variable. Usually the level of 
attendance (to religious services) and general (religious) adherence rate are taken into 
consideration.
3
 Attendance rates are constructed by the surveys that are delivered at the 
individual level.  In the following paragraphs, I explain the variables and the data sources used in 
the paper. 
 2.4.1 Entrepreneurship (Enti): self-employment & small firms growth rate 
The idea of using self-employment as a proxy for entrepreneurship has been challenged and 
criticized in the literature but overall it can be claimed as one of the typical determinants (Parker, 
2004). Low et al. (2005) define two measures of entrepreneurial potential. One is an indicator of 
the ―breadth‖ of entrepreneurship and the other is a measure of its ―depth‖. Share of self-
employment (non-farm proprietors) from total non-farm employment is the variable for 
capturing the breadth of entrepreneurial potential and the average income of non-farm 
proprietors in the accounted county is the indicator of depth of entrepreneurship. The first 
measure refers to the concentration of entrepreneurs and basically shows how rich a county is as 
far as entrepreneurial activities. On the other hand, depth variable would account for the amount 
of wealth that entrepreneurs generate and therefore could lead to continuous growth in the 
number of entrepreneurs.  In this paper, the first measure in Low et al. (2005), share of self-
                                                          
3
 ―Belief in god‖, ―importance of religion in daily life‖ and similar variables are common as well in the literature.  
18 
 
employment, is used as a proxy for entrepreneurship. The data of proprietors are from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) over the time range of years 2000 to 2010. 
In the literature small businesses are perceived as a vehicle for both Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs, those who introduce innovative production process, and also for those who are 
simply self-employed (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).  This means small establishments and 
firms provide an opportunity for innovative ideas to develop and grow. Also because of low cost 
they are more suitable for starting self-employment businesses. In general due to the small scale 
of cost and management, small businesses are better platform for growing entrepreneurial start-
ups. Small businesses not only contribute to the employment level but also to innovative and 
competitive power. The importance of small firms and their relationship to entrepreneurship is 
not a new observation. Henderson (2006) implements ratio of small firms to the total number of 
establishment as a proxy for entrepreneurial potential.  
The second measure of entrepreneurship considered in the chapter is the average annual 
growth rate of firms with less than 500 employees. There are different definitions for small 
businesses depending on the structure of the firm, the support it receives from the public 
agencies or the size of its employment. For the size of employment also there are different 
categorizations. Here I considered less than 500 employees as small firm and using the data from 
Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) for year 2000 to 2009. I constructed the annual growth rate 
of the number of these small firms in each county. This variable basically measures the change in 
the number of active small firms. Counties present different trend in the combination of small 
and large establishment and firms. In some localities the number of active small firms shows 
high volatility as we observe different rate of birth and death of small businesses. 
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The limitation of empirical studies on capturing entrepreneurship activities always exists. 
I believe these two variables, as several studies in the literature (mentioned in the literature 
review section) also use them, are good proxies for showing a large portion of entrepreneurial 
potential of the counties. One point however worth mentioning is the difference in the statistical 
nature of them. The first variable, percentage of self-employment, is a level variable but the other 
variable is a growth rate. So in interpretation of the coefficients and marginal effects this 
difference should be considered. 
2.4.2  Religious Factors (RELi): Religiosity & Religious Diversity 
In the quantitative research related to the topic of religion, measuring the religiosity level has 
always been an issue. Different studies have been employing different proxies and using various 
data sets available. Almost all of the cross country studies use the data from the World Value 
Survey (WVS) and utilize some questions regarding the belief in life after the death or religious 
denominations to measure the religiosity. Studies concentrated on the U.S. however mostly 
employ the data available through the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) or 
General Social Survey (GSS). Here in this paper church membership and religious adherence 
percentage from Religious Congregations and Membership Studies provided by ARDA are the 
main explanatory variables for religiosity. [See Appendix for more detail on the description of 
the related survey of the data].  
The main variable is the percentage of population who are members of religious 
congregations. This is from year 2000 survey dataset.  The individual adherence rate of main 
groups; Mainline, Evangelical, and Catholic denominations are just added to investigate any 
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possible individual impact of them
4
. They are not in the core attention of the hypothesis but as a 
side issue are addressed in the Appendix. 
Choosing religious adherence percentage as the main proxy for level of religiosity was 
based on two reasons. First past literature (Azzi and Erenberg, 1975; Lipford and Tomlinson, 
2003; Barro 2004; Gruber, 2005) implemented this measure in different levels (national or cross 
countries) of studies. Second availability of data with specified location has been a limitation.
5
  
For the other religious variable, religious diversity, a relatively common measure of 
fractionalization is used. Gini-Simpson index as shown below represents the plurality or 
diversity.  It simply determines the probability that two random entities selected from a 
population would represent the same type. 
     ∑(




   
   
 
where, Lci is the number of individuals in county C that belongs to religion (denomination) i. Lc 
is the total population of county C. So as    is higher and closer to 1, county C shows higher 
level of denominational plurality. This measure here mostly captures the diversity among 
Christianity‘s different main denominations. Mainline, Evangelical, Catholic, Orthodox and 
others are the main groups used to calculate the fractionalization index. 
2.4.3  Covariates  
Several control variables based on previous literature of entrepreneurship [e.g. Mojica et al. 
(2009) and Henderson (2006)] are included in the empirical models.  
 
                                                          
4
 Note that the selection of individual denominations is solely based on the rank of the denomination membership 
share in the total adherence population. Also Latter-day Saints denominations are excluded in this study. 
5
 GSS data set does not include geo information. This is the reason despite its advantages it is not used here. 
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Demographic Characteristics (Ωi): 
A higher skilled labor force is expected to be more productive and probably has potential to 
manage an entrepreneurial activity (Goetz and Freshwater, 2001; Evans and Leighton, 1989; 
Bates, 1993; Audretsch and Fritsch,  1994; Malecki,  1994; Bregger,  1996; Robson, 1998). 
That is why education attainment measured by percentage of population with a bachelor or 
higher degree, is included in the model and expected to have a positive relationship with 
dependent variable. However the type of education is a key in its relationship with 
entrepreneurship. One can imagine high tech education or more technical engineering degrees 
help individuals to start up their business in the related fields. But degrees in sciences might not 
necessarily be like that and may help the graduate to find a job in a public school or institute.
6
  
Locations with higher average income per capita can be attractive for entrepreneurs to 
start their business or expand their networks. So it is expected that counties with higher average 
income would be a safer or more suitable platform for growing entrepreneurship. Therefore per 
capita income is another control variable. Also higher unemployment rates raise the odds of lay-
offs and the relative returns to self-employment and, therefore, increase the share of 
proprietorships in all jobs. 
Population density is a typical criterion to be considered of some significance in 
explaining the level of self-employment or other aspects of entrepreneurial potentials especially 
when the rural economic variables are matter of concern. Median age of residents of counties 
also is another demographic characteristic included. 
 
 
                                                          
6
 This is a concern that should be addressed in future research. 
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Regional Characteristics (πi): 
Owner-occupied homes and median housing values in counties are considered as control 
variables. Homeownership and higher housing values significantly enhance proprietors‘ ability 
to secure finance they need (Robson, 1998). Therefore it is expected that higher percentage of 
homeownership and higher housing value would be associated with higher entrepreneurial 
potential. 
It is expected that counties with higher level of connectivity to the transportation network 
show a higher level of entrepreneurship. So a dummy variable accounting for access to interstate 
highways serves as another measure for infrastructure.  
Another variable included is the level of natural amenity rank for counties, as measured 
by climate and a number of related variables (McGranahan, 1999), and it is expected, ceteris 
paribus, higher level of amenities to be associated with higher potential for entrepreneurship. 
This index takes values between 1 to 7 and the higher the better natural amenities representing 
county has. Finally, rural-urban continuum code is used in the regressions as another control 
variable. Ranging from 1 to 9, this code shows the continuum of metro to rural counties. The 
higher the code is, the more rural feature (less population and less adjacency to metro area) it 
has. 
Policy Characteristics (∆i): 
Government can directly impact entrepreneurship at any level. Particularly, taxes, government 
spending and regulations are important in this analysis. Per capita federal government 
expenditure as a potential positively related variable and also property tax revenue set of the 
local governments, are included. These account for the potentials of infrastructure provision. 
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Counties with higher infrastructure can be attractive for new businesses and therefore be 
effective in the entrepreneurial potential of accounted locality.  
Finally, I use Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) to capture the effect of various 
government policies on self-employment and small firms‘ growth. This annually reported index 
put together 32 to 38 different government-imposed or government related costs which directly 
or indirectly impact entrepreneurial activities in state level.  The major areas of concern are taxes 
(income, capital gain, corporate, etc.) and regulations (health care, minimum wage, workers‘ 
compensation, etc.). The lower the value of index, the lower government imposing cost would 
be, or the state is more entrepreneurship friendly. 
This leads to the following general model of entrepreneurship level in county i : 
                          
One important point should be noted here. The analysis is a cross-section. But most of the 
variables are averaged out throughout a period of a decade. Religious variables are all from year 
2000; entrepreneurship variables however are simply the average for years between 2000 to 2009 
or 2010. Control variables are mixed of averaged and level. Table 2.1 presents the summary of 
statistics and their sources. 
2.5 Methodology  
Following the theoretical argument and explanations of the variables and data, in this section the 
empirical method to test the hypothesis is presented.  
I first check the possible relationship between religious factors and entrepreneurship 
measures with an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) baseline regression. 
                                         
     (1) 
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where Y denotes the dependent variable, entrepreneurship level and X represents the matrix of 
independent variables including religiosity, religious diversity and all the control variables. 
Simple OLS result has some useful insight for motivating the hypothesis of the paper but 
definitely it is not enough.  Results are shown in Table 2.2.  
Results present different signs for coefficients of religious factors in the two regressions. 
This can simply tell that in the two regressions, dependent variables are capturing different parts 
of entrepreneurship. In other words, the relationship that we observe among religious factors and 
entrepreneurship is different for the two dependent variables. One may argue that the mechanism 
through which religion impacts self-employment is different from that or small firms‘ growth. 
But both of the variables are representing entrepreneurial potentials.  Table 2.2 shows that an 
increase of one percent rate of adherence will decrease the rate of self-employment by 0.14 
percent but it increases the growth of small firms. Moreover counties with diverse range of 
congregational members experience lower self-employment rate but higher small firms growth.   
These inferences cannot be very reliable due to the arguments that follow. As one of the 
main contributions of the paper, I want to discover the possible spatial behavior of the two main 
variables, religious factors and entrepreneurship. If it is confirmed that indeed there is a spatial 
dependency, then OLS result cannot be reliable. 
2.6 Spatial Dependence 
Although counties (the unit of analysis here) are well differentiated units, the underlying spatial 
correlation among them can sometimes be difficult to distinguish using these boundaries, 
particularly with respect to religious adherence and the nature of labor market. These 
overlapping spatial relationships could cause problems with the framework used to collect 
information from these localities. For example, religiosity variables may not line up with the 
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borders of the county. It is likely that some of the adherents in a particular church live in a 
different county. The data on membership and adherent figures were collected by the localities in 
which the congregation itself is located, rather than by the state in which individuals actually 
reside. So this shows an implicit spatial effect.  Also the measures of entrepreneurial potentials 
(the dependent variables) can have the same behavior. One county‘s entrepreneurship level can 
be dependent on the economic factors including self-employment of the neighboring counties. 
Therefore, any empirical analysis of issues in regions or localities should take these overlapping 
relationships into consideration. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 present the maps for religious adherence rate 
and self-employment in the US counties respectively. By a general view of these maps, we can 
observe some source of spatial dependency trace for these two variables. 
In the presence of spatial effects, the estimated parameters without spatial correction can 
be inefficient and/or biased. Previous studies on related topics including income growth using 
US county- and state-level data have confirmed that these regional cross-sectional data display 
spatial dependence (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Rupasingha et al., 2002). This can be a guideline 
to extend the argument for entrepreneurship variables as well. One can claim that the self-
employment rate in West Virginia and Kentucky might share more similarity than that of West 
Virginia and California. The same thing can be expected for religious parameters.  
Spatial dependence in a model can be due to different reasons. On one hand the 
dependent variable in one locality can be influenced by the same variable in neighboring 
locations. If this is the case, the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) should be used. On the 
other hand, spatial dependence could be presented in the residuals when there are omitted 
unobservable variables that can be spatially correlated. In this case, the Spatial Error Model 
(SEM) is estimated to correct the spatial bias. 
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But besides these, if the relationship between independent variables of concern 
(religiosity and religious diversity here) and the dependent variable (entrepreneurship) have 
spatial components, then we should think of some other types of models. This means that for 
example religious adherence rate of one county affects the self-employment rate in the 
neighboring county. In that case, Spatially Lagged Explanatory Variables Model (SLX) should 
be estimates. But if not only we see the spatial dependence between religious factors and 
entrepreneurship but also an auto-spatial dependence in entrepreneurship variable, then Spatial 
Durbin Model (SDM) is the specifications to use. So in general possible specifications are as 
follow: 
SAR:            (2) 
SEM:                ,         (3) 
SLX:            (4) 
SDM:                (5) 
where; Y denotes an nx1 vector of the dependent variable, X represents an nxk matrix containing 
the independent variables,  and W is a spatial weight matrix.
7
 Scalar   denotes a spatial lag 
parameter,   denotes scalar spatial error parameter,   denotes the k parameters to be estimated 
for the explanatory variables, and    is the scalar representing the weighted independent 
variables.  
Now which of these model specifications would explain the spatial behavior of the 
variable better? A careful model selection procedure is conducted to answer this question. 
Besides Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, an algorithm suggested by Elhorst (2010) has been 
followed to conclude the most desired model. The Elhorst‘s suggested procedure is as follows:  
first by using LM test it is checked if the OLS model can be rejected in favor of either SAR or 
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 The weight matrix is 5-nearest neighbor weight matrix. However LeSage and Pace (2010) describes that if the 




SEM or both. Whichever model is picked it will be used in a likelihood ratio (LR) test against 
SDM model. Finally if any of the SAR or SEM would pass the test, they will be the ―best‖ 
model, otherwise SDM will be picked.  
After doing so, it turned out that Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) has the most favorable 
data generating process for the current data set. LM test
8
 results and the detail of Elhorst 
procedure and its results are presented in the Appendix A. 
 Having SDM as the ―best‖ model suggests that there is a possibility for a spatial behavior 
not only in the entrepreneurship variables, but also in the relationship between independent 
variables and dependent one. It means self-employment and other entrepreneurial measures in 
one county affect the same parameters in neighboring counties. Moreover religious factors (and 
control variables) of neighboring counties would impact county‘s entrepreneurship. 
 
2.7 Results and Discussion 
The regression results of all alternative specifications, SAR, SEM and SLX are presented in the 
Appendix, (Table A2.3 through A2.5). Here I focus on the results from the main model, SDM, 
presented in Table 2.3.  
It seems that religiosity and religious diversity both show positive and significant total 
impact on entrepreneurship. So for example if adherence rate goes up with one percentage 
points, rate of self-employment grows by 0.07 percentage points, and growth rate of small firms 
will increase by 0.03 percentage points.  Also a unit change in religious diversity would change 
self-employment by 7.7 percentage points and small firms‘ growth by almost 4 percentage points 
in the same direction. For a more detail analysis, we need to look into the direct and indirect 
effects. Direct effect refers to the impact of religious factors on entrepreneurship in the same 
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locality, and indirect effect points to the relationship between the two variables over the borders 
of the counties.  
2.7.1 Direct Effects 
Share of self-employment and growth rate of small firms present negative relationship with 
religiosity of the same county. Higher number of people as members of religious congregations 
is associated with less entrepreneurial activities. So this result simply state that more religious 
counties would have lower potential for entrepreneurship. Such relationship can be explained as 
follows.  
First, as mentioned before, teachings of religion and the set of rules and frameworks it 
provides affect the economic behavior of individuals. One channel through which it can affect 
entrepreneurial activity is risk-taking behavior. The idea of risk taking is in the heart of 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs in general are risk takers. This particular behavioral 
characteristic however is not quite promoted by religious teachings. In contrast, most of the 
religions one way or the other promote the spirit of conservatism which values the hard and 
―good‖ work within the established frame and not a revolutionary or radical change. The 
relevance of the relationship of risk behavior and religious belief set has been looked at from 
different angles in the literature. Most of the empirical studies have tested this relationship in the 
individual micro level (Rupasingha and Chilton, 2009). For example Leon and Sepulveda (2012) 
examine the relationship between level of religiosity of individuals and their saving/investment 
preferences. They find religious people are significantly more cautious and risk-averse than non-
religious ones. Along the same line, here I expand the reasoning to aggregated level of adherents 
in one locality, and expect more religious society to be more conservative and less risk-loving. 
 Secondly, membership and contributing to the religious service have opportunity cost. 
One can claim instead of going to church or spending resources on religious related activities, 
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individuals can participate in ―productive‖ economic tasks. This is somewhat a classic argument 
in the literature which looks at religion as a consumption good with a large set of substitutes 
(Barro and McCleary, 2003). 
So these two reasons would mainly explain why we see negative impacts of religiosity on 
entrepreneurship. Also there can be some other minor reasoning too, for example certain types of 
businesses and economic activities are not very welcome to grow and expand in religious 
localities. Although it may sums up to a small portion of self-employment and firms, but it still 
can be a source for such relationship between religious factors and dependent variables.
9
 
The direct effect of religious diversity shows opposite sign for the two different 
dependent variables. More religiously diverse county would have significantly lower rate of self-
employment but higher growth rate for its small firms. Small businesses, due to higher 
opportunity and bigger market that they would have, grow more in diverse societies. However in 
the same time a fractionalized society consisting of different religious group, with a potential of 
competition and not getting along well, may result in lower level of productive activities. So the 
different sign for the direct effect of religious diversity can partially be explained within these 
two strands of logic. 
2.7.2  Indirect Effects 
In contrast to the direct effect, for both dependent variables we see positive indirect effect of 
religious factors. Higher religiosity and religious diversity promote entrepreneurship in 
neighboring counties. Part of such relationship can be explained due to the mobility of the 
entrepreneurs. This means that one county is not attractive for entrepreneurial activities because 
of higher religiosity of it, and this make the entrepreneur to move to neighboring counties. 
Considering the direct effect of religiosity on entrepreneurship, religious communities are not 
                                                          
9
 One area that is needed to be studies in further research is to break up the self-employment and small firms by 
industry and occupation. That will give a more detailed and clear idea of the causal mechanism.  
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attractive to entrepreneurs. They may move to neighboring localities which are not necessarily as 
religious as the original county.  
Here I bring up four individual examples of neighboring counties and the way 
entrepreneurship and religiosity have been associated to each other. In figures 2.3 through 2.6, 
four cases of neighboring counties within one state and cross different states are shown with the 
related data points of adherence rate, self-employment and small firms‘ growth. For example in 
figure 2.3, Belmont county in Ohio shows a steadily higher adherence rate of around 60 percent 
in comparison to its neighbors in West Virginia (Wetzel and Tyler counties). Also it presents 
significantly lower self-employment rate and small firms‘ growth. These counties are much 
related in the sense of mobility of labor and the connectivity between them. Figure 2.4 looks at 
the same issue in the state of New York. County Otsego in the neighboring location of counties 
Montgomery, Herkimer and Oneida presents lower religiosity and higher entrepreneurial 
potential. Same argument for the other two figures presented can be brought up.
10
 
Overall, we can see that high religiosity in one county result in more entrepreneurs 
deciding to live in surrounding localities. Such positive indirect impact is due to the significant 
tie between the direct and indirect effect. 
 2.7.3 Entrepreneurship spillover effect 
The rho coefficient, that shows the spillover effect of dependent variable, is significant for both 
small firms‘ growth and self-employment ratio. This suggests that after controlling for spatial 
variation of independent variables, entrepreneurship show spatial distribution. This dependence 
seems to be more significant for small firms‘ growth. The reason can be that the relationship 
among firms is not limited to the borders of counties and this can be claimed for small businesses 
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 It is important to note that these individual examples are not the base of reasoning. But since they satisfy the logic 
presented in here, they are listed as examples. Certainly there are other examples that not necessarily support the 
argument and can even be used as counter-argument. 
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as well. This argument cannot be stated with the same level of confidence for the number of self-
employees.  
2.7.4 Control variables 
The results for control variables to a large extend satisfy the expectations. The significance and 
the magnitude are quite stable for the models of the two dependent variables. For example the 
per capita income level has a positive direct but negative indirect effect on self-employment and 
small firms‘ growth rate. So higher level of income in one county promotes more entrepreneurial 
activities, but more income level in neighboring counties would draw the entrepreneurs away 
from the accounted county. Therefore it seems income level is an attractive variable for 
entrepreneurs. Education level however, has different direction of impacts for the two models. 
Higher education directly leads to lower self-employment but higher growth of small firms. But 
indirectly it benefits both of the entrepreneurship variables. One way to explain this is that 
people with higher degree of education, would be qualified to work for a bigger organization or 
company, which provide a higher level of salary in comparison to self-employment. So indirectly 
income is an incentive that channels the education‘s impact on entrepreneurship. 
 Government per capita expenditure and population density both show very small 
negligible impact on entrepreneurship. Natural amenity index, as expected, affects the level of 
self-employment and small firms‘ growth positively.  The METRO variable represents the 
metro-rural continuum index. As the index increases the accounted location is more rural and 
less connected to metro areas. Results show that as counties which are more rural have higher 
self-employment but lower growth of small firms. The coefficient for the highway access 
variable shows that more connected counties experience lower self-employment. Finally, as it 
was expected, more restriction of government on the market by taxation and regulations causes a 
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decrease in the level of entrepreneurship. The coefficient for Small Business Survival Index is 
negative directly and indirectly for both models. 
2.7.5 Denominational variables results 
In section 5 of the Appendix (Table A2.6), I included the short version (covariates are not 
presented in the table) of SDM results for denominational adherence rate variables. ―MAINRT‖, 
―EVANRT‖ and ―CATHRT‖ represent the percentage of population who are members of 
Mainline, Evangelical and Catholic congregations respectively.  
 Including these variables overall does not change the significance and the signs of control 
variables. The rate of adherence to Mainline congregation, positively affects self-employment 
but negatively impacts small firms‘ growth in counties. Almost the same pattern can be seen for 
the other two congregational adherence rates. Significance and magnitude vary but the direction 
of impacts is quite the same among them.  
2.8 Conclusion and Discussion 
The purpose of this paper was to examine whether religious adherence rate and religious 
diversity can partially explain the entrepreneurship level in the U.S. counties. Also the spillover 
effect and the spatial behavior of these variables were in the core of the research question. Two 
main variables for measuring entrepreneurship are self-employment rate and growth of small 
firms.  
 After testing five different specifications of models and reporting the results, it turned 
out that the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) was the most appropriate. In this model, not only the 
spatial behavior of entrepreneurship is considered, but also the effects over the borders for 
religious factors would be accounted.  
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The results indicate that religiosity is not beneficial for self-employment rate and growth 
of small firms in the same locality. But it has positive effects on neighboring counties‘ 
entrepreneurial potential. The effect over the borders of counties (indirect effect) exceeds the 


















A2.0 Related Literature 
Tome (1984) investigates the role of religious and denominational backgrounds on earnings and 
the returns to human capital, but he finds no evidence to support the connection between the two. 
Steen (1996) tests the correlation among earnings differentials and rates of return to human 
capital for different religious backgrounds using data from the National Longitudinal Survey. His 
findings indicate that men raised as Catholics have a significantly higher income than men raised 
as Protestants. Also Jewish men have significantly higher earnings than men raised in all other 
religious traditions. Sander (2002), using General Social Survey (GSS) data, investigates the 
endogeneity between human capital and religious activities. He finds that education is not an 
exogenous determinant of attendance at weekly religious services and religious contributions, 
and there is no causal effect of education on religious activity when education is treated as 
endogenous.  Fan (2008) formulates a theoretical model of linking religion and education. His 
model attempts to combine sociological and economics literature and shows that people‘s 
religious participation is determined by the concern for their children‘s human capital 
accumulation as well as their religious beliefs.  
 
A2.1 Short explanation on the religious adherence data 
Data on religion factors are from a study designed and completed by the Association of 
Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB), which represents statistics for 149 
religious bodies on the number of congregations within each county of the United States. Where 
available, also included are actual membership (as defined by the religious body) and total 
adherents figures. Participants included 149 Christian denominations, associations, or 
communions (including Latter-day Saints and Unitarian/Universalist groups); two specially 
defined groups of independent Christian churches; Jewish and Islamic totals; and counts of 
temples for six Eastern religions. Totally 741 variables and 3142 cases are reported. The study 
and data collection were completed in between 1999 to 2001. The 149 groups reported 268,254 
congregations with 141,371,963 adherents, which is 50.2% of the population of 281,421,839. 
There are 14 non-participating religious bodies that reported more than 100,000 members to the 
Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches, 2000, including all historically African 
American denominations. These groups reported a combined membership of 31,040,360 in the 
Yearbook, which is not reflected in the congregations and membership data. The lack of 
historically African American denominations should be noted when referencing the number of 






A2.2 LM-Tests Results 
The following two tables show the LM test results for the two dependent variables. It can be 
concluded that between SAR and SEM models, SEM is a better specification for both. 
1Table A2.1: LM Test---Dependent Variable SELFEMP 
TEST  LM-test Statistics Value P-Value 
LM-Lag 44.2765068949088 0.00 
LM-Lag Robust 52.7679596459724 0.00 
LM-Error 94.1171226289587 0.00 
LM-Error Robust 102.627032589765 0.00 
 
2Table A2.2: LM Test---Dependent Variable AVEGROW 
TEST  LM-test Statistics Value P-Value 
LM-Lag 534.439133135445 0.00 
LM-Lag Robust 3.19754333675235 0.073748973195264 
LM-Error 572.222956579739 0.00 
LM-Error Robust 41.2023000073454 0.00 
A1.3 Elhorst (2010) model selection procedure 
For the dependent variables, the following procedure is presented and the results are reported 
here. 
1.  LM test points to the ―better‖ model among OLS, SAR and SEM. 
2. The ―better‖ model (either SEM or SAR) would be tested using the likelihood ration (LR) 
with the following two hypotheses: 
        
           
If the first hypothesis cannot be rejected, SAR is the model and we cannot use SDM. And 
if the second hypothesis cannot be rejected, SEM would be the best model and we should 
discard SDM. If opposite of any of above happens, SDM should be selected. As it is 
shown below, it happens to be the case and Spatial Durbin Model selected as the primary 
specification. 
 Dependent Variable: SELFEMP 
 LM-test result confirms that SEM is a better DGP than SAR and OLS. 
 LR-test 
Test LR-test Statistics Value p-Value Result 
SAR vs. SDM 260.3446 0 SDM 
 
Test LR-test Statistics Value p-Value Result 
SEM vs. SDM 211.4362 0 SDM 
Given both LM and LR test, SDM would be the best model for SELFEMP variable. 
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 Dependent Variable : AVEGROW 
 LM-test result confirms that SEM is a better DGP than OLS and SAR. 
 LR-test 
Test LR-test Statistics Value p-Value Result 
SAR vs. SDM 102.3254 0 SDM 
 
Test LR-test Statistics Value p-Value Result 
SEM vs. SDM 72.811 0 SDM 
Given both LM and LR test, SDM would be the best model for AVEGROW variable. 
Note: One other step is to compare the OLS and SLX. This would follow the same procedure, 
but since SDM results (rho coefficients) are significant overall we can claim that SDM procedure 




















A2.4 Alternative Models Results 
3Table A2.3:SAR Results 
Dependent Variable 
Self-employment rate  
(SELFEMP) 
Annual Average Growth rate of small firms 
(AVEGROW) 
 
Total Direct Indirect 
 
Total Direct Indirect 
Constant 27.763 
(9.074) 
   -1.48 
(-2.9) 
  





































































































































































































4Table A2.4 :SEM Results 
Dependent Variable 
Self-employment rate  
(SELFEMP) 
 Annual average growth of 
small firms  
(AVEGROW) 
 Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 

















































































































R-squared 0.2038 0.3174 
Rbar-squared 0.2012 0.3152 
log-likelihood -9728.8134 -4309.217 




5Table A2.5:SLX Results 
Dependent Variable 
Self-employment rate  
(SELFEMP) 
  Annual average growth of small firms  
(AVEGROW) 
 
Coefficient t-statistic  
 
Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 3.50 0.781  -5.31*** -6.47 
Percent rate of all denominations adherence (TOTRT) -0.21*** -9.23   0.007** -1.736 
Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV) -19.03*** -6.82   1.42** 2.78 
Per capita Income (INC) 0.315*** 7.74   0.002 0.367 
Percent of population with at least bachelor degree (EDU) -0.193*** -6.57   0.046*** 8.57 
Median Age (MEDAGE) 1.008* 2.05   -1.057* -1.98 
Population Density (POPDEN) -0.005 -1.63   -0.045** -1.72 
Per capita Federal Expenditure (GOVEX) -0.24*** -5.30   -0.50*** -8.64 
Percent of Houses occupied by owners (HOUSOWN) 0.001*** 5.23   0.003*** 6.27 
Median value of Housing (MEDHVAL) 0.003** 2.44   0.007** 2.41 
Percentage of population unemployed (UNEMP) -0.003* -1.80   -0.002** -2.46 
Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) -1.551** -2.23   -1.348*** -4.68 
Property Tax Revenue (PROPTAX) 0.171*** 11.32   0.002 0.72 
Natural Amenity Index (NATAMEN) -0.106 -0.35   0.042 0.773 
Rural-Urban Index (METRO) 0.650*** 7.11   -0.059*** -3.56 
Interstate Highway access (HWY) -2.903*** -7.913   -0.070 -1.04 
Weighted Percent rate of all denominations adherence (WTOTRT) 0.27*** 8.23   0.037*** 6.192 
Weighted Religious Diversity Index (WRELDIV) 25.49*** 5.998   2.26*** 2.907 
Weighted Per capita Income (WINC) -0.370*** -5.42   -0.043*** -3.461 
Weighted Percent of population with at least bachelor degree (WEDU) 0.376*** 7.34   0.028*** 3.026 
Weighted Median Age (WMEDAGE) 0.248* 
 
2.15   -1.551** -2.88 
Weighted Population Density (WPOPDEN) 0.085 0.41   -0.171 -0.342 
Weighted Per capita Federal Expenditure (WGOVEX) 0.02 1.254   0.08 0.708 
Weighted Percent of Houses occupied by owners (WHOUSOWN) -0.081** -2.55   -0.203* -1.79 
Weighted Median value of Housing (WMEDHVAL) -7.522* -1.60   -0.002 -0.94 
Weighted Percentage of population unemployed (WUNEMP) 0.198* 1.61   0.024* 1.98 
Weighted Small Business Survival Index (WSBSI) 0.004* 1.88   0.543 1.58 
Weighted Property Tax Revenue (WPROPTAX) -0.167*** -8.99   -0.007** -2.092 
Weighted Natural Amenity Index (WNATAMEN) 1.63*** 4.72   0.334*** 5.29 
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Table A2.5 cont’d :SLX Results 
Weighted Rural-Urban Index (WMETRO) 0.416*** 3.028   0.007 0.306 
Weighted Interstate Highway access (WHWY) 1.76* 2.484   0.10 0.825 
R-squared   0.233 
  
0.203 
Rbar-squared    0.228 
  
0.197 
***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
A2.5 Denominational Results 
 
6Table A2.6 :SDM Results 
Dependent Variable 
Self-employment rate  
(SELFEMP)  
Annual average growth of small firms 
(AVEGROW) 
 
Total Direct Indirect  Total Direct Indirect 








































































***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level
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Table 2.1 : Descriptive Statistics and Sources      
Variables Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Source* 
    
  
 Entrepreneurship 
   
  
 SELFEMP (Non-farm Proprietor Employment/Total Non-farm Employment)*100: Averaged 
2000-2010 
23.98 9.23 3.045243 68.53041 BEA-REIS 
AVEGROW Average Annual Growth of small (less than 500 employees)firms 
Averaged 2000-2009 
-0.0718 1.65 -13.27569 17.22222 USCB 
       
Religion       
TOTRT All Denominations—Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000 53.2298 18.26162 1.816347 98.379 ARDA 
MAINRT Mainline Denominations—Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000 14.1949 11.38461 0 88.40 ARDA 
EVANRT Evangelical Denominations-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000 22.8218 16.9146 0 99.37 ARDA 
CATHRT Catholic Church-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000 13.807 14.85797 0 94.68 ARDA 
ORTHRT Orthodox Denominations-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000 0.0637 0.25 0 3.78 ARDA 
OTHERRT Other Denominations-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000 2.34 8.56 0 74.21 ARDA 
RELDIV Religious Diversity Index-Year 2000 












INC Per capita Income(in thousands of dollars): Averaged 2000-2010 28.77 6.75 13.63 98.37 BEA 
EDU % of Population (25 years and older) with bachelor or higher degree 
Averaged 2000-2010 
15.62 5.93 3.78 70.15 USCB 
MEDAGE Median age of population: Year 2000 35.21 3.55 21.91 54.73 USCB 
HOUSOWN Percent of homes occupied by owners: Averaged 2000-2010 73.41 7.38 17.65 88.24 USCB 
MEDHVAL Median value of housing(in ten thousands of dollars): Averaged 2000-2010 6.453 3.284 1.498 48.831 USCB 
UNEMP Percent of Population who are unemployed : Averaged 2000-2010 7.18 2.48 0.53 38.2 USCB 
GOVEX Per capita Federal Government Expenditure (in  thousands dollars):  
Averaged 2000-2004 
6.914 4.012 1.206 15.868 USCB 
PROPTAX Property Tax Revenue (% of total Revenue): Year 2002 62.6175 18.15813 2 93 USCB 
SBSI Small Business Survival Index: Averaged 2000-2010 60.91 12.75 27.55 88.82 SBEC 
NATAMEN Natural Amenities Index (1-7) 3.492 1.04 1 7 ERS-USDA 
METRO Rural-Urban Continuum Code (1-9) 5.14 2.67 1 9 ERS-USDA 
POPDEN Population Density (Hundreds of population per square mile) in Year 2000 2.35 13.655 0.00044 669.401 BEA-REIS 
HWY Dummy for Interstate highway access (0-1)  0.4364 0.4960 0 1 Constructed-USCB 
*BEA-REIS: Bureau of  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System; ARDA: Association of Religion Data Archives; USCB: U.S. Census Bureau,  
SBEC: small Business & Entrepreneurship Council 
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7Table 2.2 :OLS Results 
Dependent Variable 
Self-employment rate  
(SELFEMP) 
 
Annual average growth of small firms  
(AVEGROW) 
 Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 28.84*** 
 
(9.34)  -2.67*** (-4.84) 
Percent rate of all denominations adherence (TOTRT) -0.14*** 
 
(-7.87)  0.005* (1.76) 
Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV) -17.06*** 
 
(-6.96)  1.65*** (3.76) 
Per capita Income (INC) 0.27*** 
 
(7.23)  0.002 (-1.10) 
Percent of population with at least bachelor degree (EDU) -0.13*** 
 
(-4.85)  0.05*** (10.15) 
Median Age (MEDAGE) 1.56** 
 
(2.66)  -0.59* (-1.66) 
Population Density (POPDEN) -0.081 
 
(-1.49)  -0.005** (-2.36) 
Per capita Federal Expenditure (GOVEX) -0.24*** 
 
(-5.20)  -0.11*** (-8.98) 
Percent of Houses occupied by owners (HOUSOWN) 0.003*** (5.38)  0.007*** (4.21) 
Median value of Housing (MEDHVAL) 0.05** (2.84)  0.08** (2.88) 
Percentage of population unemployed (UNEMP) -0.0004* (-1.99)  -0.008 (-1.18) 
Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) -0.98*** (-4.33)  -2.14*** (-6.44) 
Property Tax Revenue (PROPTAX) 0.087*** 
 
(8.97)  0.003 (-0.79) 
Natural Amenity Index (NATAMEN) 1.22*** 
 
(7.85)  0.28*** (10.09) 
Rural-Urban Index (METRO) 0.73*** 
 
(10.20)  -0.05*** (-4.04) 
Interstate Highway access (HWY) -2.72*** 
 
(-7.83)  -0.057 
 
(-0.92) 
R-squared 0.1698  0.1752 
Rbar-squared 0.1671  0.1725 












8Table 2.3:SDM Results 
Dependent Variable 
Self-employment rate  
(SELFEMP) 
 
Annual average growth of small firms 
(AVEGROW) 
 
Total Direct Indirect 
 
Total Direct Indirect 
        








































Percent of population with at 









































































































































































R-squared 0.234  0.2065 
Rbar-squared 0.229  0.2013 
log-likelihood -9623.0953  -4272.8115 






















 Figure 2.2: Self-employment in the U.S. 
 
 
Data: Religious Adherents as Percentage of Population, Year 2000 
Source: Religious Congregations and Membership Study: 2000, ASARB 
Data: Share of Self-Employment to Total Employment, Year 2000 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis-Regional Economic Information System 












































Small Firm  
growth 
Belmont, OH 58.86% 12.35% -3.2% 
Wetzel, WV 41.07% 26.12% 0.08% 





Small Firm  
growth 
Otsego, NY 33.84% 17.35%% 0.32% 
Montgomery, NY 70.07% 12.33% -0.53% 
Herkimer, NY 54.61% 14.78% -0.06% 
Oneida, NY 52.13% 10.08% -0.26% 
Figure 2.3: Counties comparison over states border: OH-WV 
 










































Small Firm  
growth 
Hardy, WV 31.07% 44.52% 0.31% 
Highland, VA 56.58% 24.05% -0.64% 
Bath, VA 55.48% 8.81% -0.53% 
Alleghany, VA 53.73% 14.18% -1.06% 




Small Firm  
growth 
Alpine, CA 54.90%% 19.41%% -2.23% 
El Dorado, CA 26.38% 26.84% 0.86% 
Calavares, CA 31.48% 28.97% -0.03% 
Tuolumne, CA 27.03% 21.18% -0.06% 
 Figure 2.5: Counties comparison over states border: WV-VA 
 





Institutional Quality and Efficiency of Public Spending: Evidence from the 
U.S. States Governments 
 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the governments‘ biggest challenges is to develop policies that raise the standard of living 
without creating large income gaps between the rich and the poor. Depending on the time span 
and more importantly political and social ideology of governments, pro-growth or pro-equity 
policies are implemented, however pursuing both seems to be the ―better‖ strategy in the long-
run. There is a significant debate over the relationship between these two types of policies in the 
literature. Equality and Efficiency, the Big Tradeoff by Okun published 1975 is one classic 
example that thoroughly explains how and why there is a trade-off.  
Besides these arguments, several studies have shown different relationships between 
economic growth and income equality.  Although some believe they are negatively correlated, 
there are studies claiming that growth promotes equality or vice-versa (Angeles-Castro, 2006). 
There is a set of tools in hands of the state by which they can decide how to impact the size of 
pie and how to distribute it. Scholars argue that redistribution of wealth is the major function of 
government, and also it is the main source of growth in the size of fiscal state (Peltzman, 1980; 
Tullock, 1983). Basically if we want to examine the governments‘ action toward either or both 
direction of growth and equality, we need to analyze the tools it has, e.g. fiscal policies, and see 
how it uses them.  
Behind the debate on trade-off between growth and equality, there is an important 
question that opens a door to another literature which is closer to the main argument of this 
paper.  Regardless of the direction that the government picks and follows, given the fact that both 
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higher growth and more equally distributed income are favorable goals, the efficiency of the 
public sector is very important.  How effective are governments‘ policies in changing economic 
performance and equality simultaneously? More specifically we are interested to know why 
some governments are more effective in pursuing equality and efficiency than the others. Which 
factors drive the differences between them?  Our concentration here is particularly on efficiency 
of public expenditure in achieving higher growth and income equality. 
We think besides all systematic and structural factors, institutions and their quality are 
very important in changing the effectiveness of governments‘ action. Hence we focus on some 
areas of institutional arrangements to address the research question. In summary the core 
research question of the current paper is: Does institutional quality impact the efficiency of 
government spending?  
In the empirical investigation we use state-level observations from 50 state governments 
in the U.S. The proposed hypothesis is as follows: ―States with higher institutional quality have 
more efficient public spending to reach higher growth and equality.” 
The main findings confirm that there is enough evidence to support the above hypothesis. 
However it should be clearly defined and differentiated what specific institution we are referring 
to. In particular we find that states with a better judicial system and less restrictive labor market 
tend to have more efficient public spending. Furthermore political affiliation of legislature and 
executives are included in the analysis and there are some mixed results for them. 
Our contribution to the existing literature of efficiency of public spending and also 
institutional analysis can be categorized into three parts. First the methodology that we use to 
measure the efficiency, although used in other literatures, to our knowledge has not been 
employed to address the same question with these variables. Second, the scale of study which is 
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state level, considering the factors we include in the analysis, is new. Finally connecting the two 
parts on measuring efficiency and institutional consideration is our other contribution. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section an overview of the related studies 
on public spending efficiency and institutions is presented. After that we explain the research 
design, variables and data. Section 5 will present the major results and findings and finally 
section 6 states the concluding remarks. 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Much of the variation in growth rates and income inequality across economies and over time is 
still not completely understood. Although cross-country studies, based on dynamic panel data 
techniques, have been able to correct some of the methodological problems in the earlier 
literature (such as measurement and specification errors, simultaneity bias, and the potential 
causality), conclusive empirical results have yet to be obtained. The same issue exists when we 
compare the local economies (Hughes and Edwards, 2000). 
One variable that has been studied extensively is the role of fiscal policies, such as public 
spending, on growth and equality. Since the seminal contribution by Barro (1990), there have 
been a number of analytical studies highlighting the various channels through which public 
expenditure may affect growth. But, at the empirical level, robust relationships have been 
difficult to capture. In general the studies on the effects of government expenditure on growth 
appear to have various conclusions. Almost the same argument can be brought up about income 
distribution and the impact of government expenditure on it. There are studies in favor of a 
positive relationship between government expenditure and lower inequality, e.g. Afonso et al. 
(2008). But there are some which confirm the negative correlation (De Mello and Tiongson, 
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2006). Overall there is no clear consensus on the direction of the possible effects of public 
spending on either growth or equality. 
For the purpose of this paper, we focused on two segments of the literature. One is on the 
issue of effectiveness of government spending and the other consists of studies concerned about 
institutions. 
3.2.1 Public Spending and its Efficiency 
Public fiscal spending can be instrumented to stimulate any economy‘s performance both in the 
short run and in the long run. There is a lengthy literature consisting of theoretical and empirical 
studies that focuses on the extent to which public expenditure, income transfers and taxation 
impact the growth and overall economic performance (Tolmie, 2007). Fox (1999) points out the 
importance of assessing public sector performance in maintaining a prosperous economy and 
promoting growth. Barro (1990) discusses the potential for long-run growth that is derived from 
infrastructure investments. In addition, there is a sizeable literature focusing on fiscal 
expenditure and its aggregate economic effects (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).  
In the past twenty years, attention of scholars, especially in macroeconomic analysis, has 
shifted toward the idea of efficiency of public spending. In a general sense, this efficiency simply 
refers to how successful policies are to fulfill the goals. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Gupta et 
al. (2011) are among several studies that focus on different ways of assessing public spending 
effectiveness. Pritchett (2000) and Keefer and Knack (2007) besides spending, investigate the 
efficiency of public investment as well.  A few recent studies (e.g., Afonso et al., 2005; Afonso 
and Aubyn, 2005) have performed efficiency analyses using OECD data, but they do not explain 




Previous studies on the efficiency of the public sector in economic performance found a 
significant divergence of efficiency across countries and subsectors of governments. Education 
and health are the two sections that have been more analyzed. Fakin and Crombrugghe (1997) 
examine the efficiency of government subsidies in central European countries. Gupta and 
Verhoeven (2001) look into the education and health spending in African countries while 
Clements (2002) and Aubyn (2003) test education in Europe. 
In general there are two major branches of the empirical literature on efficiency of 
government spending. One is the macro/country-level and the other one is on local governments. 
Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005, 2006) examine public expenditure efficiency in economic 
performance in the OECD countries and in emerging markets. De Borger and Kerstens (1996), 
and Afonso and Fernandes (2006) find evidence of spending inefficiencies for the local public 
sectors. Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2008) investigate the efficiency of taxation and some 
other fiscal policies  in order to decrease income inequality in OECD countries.  
Most of these studies for calculating the efficiency of public sector apply the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. This is the same model we will be using here, however in 
the context of a state-level analysis for public spending efficiency in growth and income 
equality. To the authors‘ knowledge no work has been conducted using such a non-parametric 
method. 
3.2.2 Institutions 
Among the fundamental sources of long-run economic development, institutions have received 
considerable attention in recent years. North (1990) defined institutions as the ―rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction‖.  
The most obvious formal institutions are the formal rules (constitutions, laws, and property 
rights) and informal institutions (conventions and codes of behavior such as norms, customs, 
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taboos, and traditions). North further stated that institutional change shapes the way societies 
evolve through time and, hence, the direction of economic performance. 
Numerous empirical studies have provided convincing evidence to support the view that 
differences in institutions can have a large effect on output per capita, including Knack and 
Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2002), Rodrik (2002), Rodrik et al. 
(2004), Eicher and Leukert (2009). These empirical studies rely on a limited range of datasets to 
measure institutions or ―institutional quality‖ and moreover they all study national economies 
and compare countries. In the studies using institutions and their quality, always measurement is 
an important issue. There are several projects in which scholars offer some proxies for 
quantifying the quality of institutions.  
One relatively recent developed measure is Economic Freedom Index (EFW) introduced 
in Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1996). The index number is ranging from zero to ten for each 
country. As the number gets higher the economic environment is closer to free market and as it 
gets close to zero, the country has less economic freedom and lower institutional quality. A 
relatively large portion of research in this literature uses this index as a proxy for institutional 
quality (e.g. Haan, 2003; Berggren, 2003; Gwarteny, Holcombe and Lawson, 2004; Ayal and 
Karras, 1998; De Haan and Siermann, 1998; Carllson and Lundstrom, 2002). These studies use 
EFW to check the relationship of institutions with growth, income level, income distribution and 
several other socio-economic parameters. Some few papers examine effect of economic freedom 
on both growth and equality together. Scully (2002) shows economic freedom is significantly 
affective on both.   
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One other quantitative index for institutional quality is conducted by Kaufmann et al. 
(2008), World Governance Indicator (WGI). This index has six subcomponents
11
  by which 
some aspects of institutions are measured. 
In this paper, since we are interested in institutional arrangement in the local level and not 
national level, the approach as well as variables used will be slightly different from those  
employed in country-level studies. We need to come up with some sort of representative of 
state‘s institutional quality that has two properties. First it is not an outcome of a process (i.e. it is 
exogenous). Second it can be well represented by a quantifiable variable. 
 
3.3 Empirical Design, Variables, and Data 
For testing the hypothesis, we essentially take two steps. First we need to find a way to define 
and calculate the ―efficiency‖ of public spending. For this purpose a non-parametric method, 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), is employed. It is, to our knowledge, the first time in the 
related literature that this method is used to answer this research question. Second, we check if 
the efficiency has any correlation with institutional quality. 
3.3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric method, was originated from Farrell 
(1957) frontier analysis and popularized by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). The DEA 
procedure allows for an estimation of the level of technical effectiveness in a production process. 
There is a long literature with application of DEA in different areas related to efficiency or 
productivity of production units. Emrouznejad (2001) lists almost 500 studies that use DEA as an 
evaluation tool. In the urban and regional studies DEA method has a broad use. Usually topics of 
                                                          
11
 Voice and accountability, Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory 
quality, Rule of law and Control of corruption. 
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these studies are related to the efficiencies of industries or local governments (Tong, 1996; 
Hajalmarsson, 1992; De Borger, 1996). 
DEA employs linear programming to compare decision making units (DMUs) which 
produce multiple outputs using multiple inputs. A production frontier is estimated without any 
form of production technology being specified. This frontier indicates the maximum possible 
output given a certain level of input. The term ―envelopment‖ comes from the fact that the 
frontier envelops the set of observations. This frontier will then serve as a base for calculating 
the relative effectiveness (efficiency) of the DMUs. Units are either on or below the frontier.  
Each DMU‘s efficiency is defined relative to that of all others. So at a specific level of 
input the DMU with highest output would be the most efficient and then other DMUs will be 
ranked with respect to that one particular DMU. The efficient unit cannot increase the amount of 
one of its output without decreasing other output or increasing the inputs. So clearly DMUs are 
facing an optimization problem. The base of optimization process is as follows. 
For each DMU, the model finds the optimal linear combination of units in the sample 
which produces higher output level with fewer inputs. This linear combination represents a 
hypothetical composite unit that should satisfy two constraints: 
1. All output levels are greater or equal to the output level of the DMU under analysis. 
2. All input levels of the composite unit are less than or equal to the input levels of the analyzed 
DMU. 
The model searches for comparison that identifies output slack or excess input usage of 
the unit under analysis, as defined by the above inequality conditions. Suppose we have n DMUs 
and each unit has k inputs and produces m outputs. The DEA model can be sketched with the 
following mathematical programming for a given    : 
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Objective Function    
  
            (1) 
Subject to:  
Output Slack               (2) 
Excess Input            (3) 
With   
n
j ij1




   :(   ) vector of the outputs for     
   :    ) vector of the inputs for      
Y :(   ) output matrix 
X :(   ) input matrix 
   :(   ) vector of weights assigned to linear combination of comparison set 
   :(   ) vector of output slack 
   :(   ) vector of input excess 
      :     ) and    ) vectors of weights used in the evaluation process of the objective              
 function. 
The objective function in output-oriented model is to maximize the proportional increase 
in outputs produced with a given level of inputs, equation (2). For the input-oriented model the 
objective is to maximize the proportional decrease in the input necessary to produce a given level 
of output, equation (3). DEA models can be either variable return to scale (VRS) or constant 
return to scale (CRS). Choosing the return to scale, CRS versus VRS, In case the weights 
determining hypothetical composite comparison,    ,sum to one, model is VRS, otherwise it is 
CRS. 
The model used in this paper is an input-oriented DEA with variable return to scale. 
Choosing the orientation of DEA is arbitrary, as there is a duality between the two methods 
(input versus output orientation). But return to scale depends on the computational characteristics 
of the model. The frontier set for CRS models are larger than that for VRS counterparts. 
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Therefore our focus here is on the objective function subject to restriction in equation (3). The 
units of analysis, as discussed before, are state governments in the U.S. 
Basically we are assuming an implicit production function for each state. For these 
production functions there is one input and two outputs. By comparing states to each other we 
can define a relative efficiency for them. 
Input & Outputs, Efficiency Scores 
The input we use in the DEA in this paper is general public expenditure at state level. In the 
literature there are diverse subsets of public spending included in the model for calculating the 
efficiency. Here however, we only implement the main general expenditure per capita.  By 
general expenditure, we consider intergovernmental as well as direct expenditure. However it 
does not include federal transfers. So this is specifically expenditure spent and financed by state 
governments and not federal government. Data for general state government expenditure is from 
the Census Bureau on state government finance.  
For the outputs, there are two factors we included; per capita GDP growth and inverse of 
gini coefficient. These two represent the two areas we assume as the result of the public sector 
policies, one representing economic performance and the other distribution of income. Per capita 
GDP growth is from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) based on real GDP per capita in 1997 
dollar. Data for measure of inequality, gini index, is from a project by Mark Frank that provides 
a detailed dataset on several measures of income inequality in the state level from 1945 to very 
recent. This gini is a net measure and not transfer. Since here the actual output we are looking for 




Table 3.2 presents efficiency score for 50 states using DEA. These scores are based on 
averaged input and outputs for the time range between 1998 and 2005. It seems Arizona and 
Idaho have the most efficient public spending and Alaska and Wyoming with 0.28 and 0.49 are 
among the least efficient states. These numbers basically refers to the distance of each DMUs 
(state) from the frontier (or from the most efficient ones). As the numbers get smaller they show 
a further distance from the frontier. For example Alaska which has the score almost equal to 30% 
which means that this state does not use 70 percent of its input to produce the two outputs and 
therefore it acts inefficiently. Figure 3.1 also shows the calculated efficiency score on graph. As 
it is shown, states with higher score are closer to the frontier and less efficient ones, e.g. Alaska 
are far from it.
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3.3.2 Testing the relationship between efficiency and Institutions 
In the second part of empirical analysis, we use the efficiency scores calculated by DEA method 
in regression set-up to test the hypothesis. Simply we want to see if institutions have any 
significance to explain the variation of efficiency among states. The general specification of the 
model would be: 
                   (4) 
Where EFFi represents the efficiency score of state i, and INSi is a matrix of different measures 
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 As a simple representation of how the efficiency score is calculated, for example on the graph in figure 3.1, to 




3.4 Explanatory Variables: Institutions 
The area of our interest in this essay for explaining the difference in states‘ public spending 
efficiency is institutional quality. Obviously there can be a long list of different institutions, 
formal or informal. But we focus on some formal institutions that have the characteristics of 
structuring the economy rather than being output of policies.
13
  
Judicial System Quality 
The quality of judicial system is one essential factor in development. A powerful judicial system 
which enforces and protects property rights is an important basis for economic growth and 
development. Moreover this judicial system (for example of a state) can directly impact the cost 
of participating in businesses. Also judicial decisions affect the cost of mandates and in general 
businesses regulations (Hall and Sobel, 2007). So overall we can say that judicial systems in 
states are important and their quality can change the rules of game. Therefore we include a 
measure of quality of judicial system in the model.  
This measure is an index based on a survey of lawyers conducted by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce that started in 2002 and basically ranks states‘ legal liability system. The index gets 
values between 0 to 100, as the higher value refers to a ―better‖ judicial system. It covers some 
areas such as juridical impartiality, judicial competence, and general treatment of tort and 
contract litigation. These areas are reflected in the survey questions that have been conducted 
among approximately 1000 randomly selected lawyers across the country.  
When judicial system has a reliable performance in protecting and enforcing the rights, 
the institutional baseline would be provided for economic activities, including governments‘ 
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 For example some informal institutions such as culture, norms, or religion certainly in the big picture would be 
relevant. But for two reasons we are not concerned about them. First our study is state-level, therefore variation in 
such institutions among states is minimal if none. Secondly, informal institutions cannot be the variables that are 
affected (or justified) by governments.  
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policies. This is why our expectation is to see a significant and positive correlation between 
judicial system quality and efficiency of public spending.  
Labor Market 
Labor market is one important sector and its institutional changes make the economic out puts 
vary. The structure and composition of labor forces and most importantly the regulations on the 
labor market are the major factors to consider for an institutional comparison between 
economies. In this paper we control three aspects of the labor market by including three 
variables.  
 Right-to-work 
In the United States, under the 1947 federal Taft-Hartley Act, some states have passed a law that 
bans union security agreements. This law is called right-to-work. It simply means in the states 
with this law, unions and employers are forbidden from entering into agreements that require 
employees to join a union and pay dues and fees to it in order to get or keep a job. Currently 
twenty four states have the right-to-work law. Most of them are southern and western states. 
Michigan and Indiana just very recently in 2012 passed the state law for right-to-work. See the 
Appendix for the list of states. Data for this variable is from Department of Labor. 
The variable we include is a dummy for right-to-work. We think that this direct 
regulation of the state governments can affect the institutional arrangement of a state and 
ultimately the effectiveness of its fiscal tools such as public spending.  
 Union Density 
Along with the idea for including the right-to-work parameter, union density variable is another 
explanatory factor. Union density is measured as the percentage of nonagricultural employees‘ 
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population who are members of unions. Hirsch, Macpherson and Vermon (2003) put together a 
dataset on union membership and coverage in states from the year 1973 up to recent years.  
We understand the clear correlation between this variable and right-to-work and that is 
why we use them in different specifications. Union membership (density) can basically be 
assumed as a variable which is the result of particular regulation, e.g. right-to-work. Therefore, it 
may not be necessarily a variable representing the institutional arrangement of a state, but only a 
direct output of some institutional set-ups. 
 Labor Market Freedom 
This is a broad area under which one component of Economic Freedom Index of North America 
(EFNA) is calculated (See Appendix for description of the index and its components). Area 3 of 
EFNA which is on regulation has one component on labor market regulations, 3A. This segment 
itself consists of three parts. Overall this variable represents how a state or provincial 
government in the North American countries (US, Canada and Mexico) is free of government 
regulation. Minimum wage legislation, percentage of government employment and union density 
are the areas considered.  The expectation is to see less regulations and restriction on labor 
market would lead to more efficient public spending. In an economy where labor forces are free 
to choose their economic action, we would imagine governments‘ justification to the economy 
will work with less friction and ultimately more efficiently. 
 An important note is that all these three variables have high correlations and including all 
together would be problematic. The point is to capture the institutional quality (particularly here 





Quality of political institutions is certainly one key variable that is repeatedly shown in 
development literature to play an important role in economic performance. The structure of the 
political body in any government at any level is one determinant of how states manage their 
finances. When we are discussing the political arrangement in the governments of states in the 
U.S. we are particularly interested to analyze the political affiliation of two main players. On one 
hand we have the legislature section which includes Senate and House of Representatives. On 
the other hand we have the executive sector with governors. It can be a shortcoming of the 
breadth in analyzing political institutions, if we just examine the affiliations. However even by 
simplifying the complicated political system to only what party politicians belong to, we still can 
to some extent capture the role of politics in our dependent variable of concern (i.e. efficiency of 
public spending).  This criticism can be more significant when we are looking only at the two 
major political parties in the U.S. It is because there might be cases under which, for example 
one state‘s legislature by majority be Democratic but in the voting and decisions they act with 
the Republican preferences. So being member of a party does not necessarily mean satisfying the 
party goals in every occasion. 
 For legislature political affiliation, we look into the majority of states senate and house of 
representative separately. Then by combining the two, we have one measure, as a dummy that 
represents the general legislature sector‘s affiliation. For example if for one state in the senate 60 
percent of politicians are republican and in the house only 30 percent are republican, we can say 
that overall the majority of legislature politicians in that state are Democrats. Therefore the 
dummy variable would get value of zero. In the case of republican majority, the dummy variable 
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would get value of 1. This variable is constructed based on the data from National Conference Of 
States Legislatures (NSCL).  
 Same argument, but less complicated is applied for the executive sector by taking 
governors‘ political affiliation. National Governors Association (NGA) provides a 
comprehensive datasets on political affiliation of governors along with so many other details for 
a relatively long period of time.  
Summary of variables descriptive statistics is presented in Table 3.1. Note that all 
variables are from a pooled observation for year 1998 to 2005. 
3.5 Empirical Analysis 
 
Table 3.3 presents Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results for nine different specifications. In these 
regressions observations for the time period between 1998 to 2005 are pooled. In the 
specifications with more independent variables, size of sample is smaller. This is because of data 
availability of some variables. For example Judicial System Quality is available only for a 
limited time range. Models 1 through 6 essentially represent the bivariate regressions between 
efficiency scores and our six major explanatory variables.  
As it was expected, quality of judicial system is positively associated with the efficiency 
score. All the three measures we included for the labor market quality confirm that less 
regulations and more freedom in the labor market are favorable for effectiveness of government 
spending. As the coefficient of union membership variable (MEM) with high significance shows 
negative effect on efficiency, we can claim that states with more union power tend to be 
spending less efficiently.  The same argument can be stated for positive and significant 
coefficient of right-to-work variable. For political environment variables, it seems that only 
63 
 
legislature political affiliation matters for efficiency of public spending. The results show that a 
Republican majority legislature on average is associated with more efficient public spending.  
Model 7, 8 and 9 include all the variables but in none of them the three labor market variables 
are present simultaneously. The reason for that, as discussed before, is that labor market 
variables are highly correlated and having them together in the regression would cause problems. 
Although choosing one model is not the concern here but comparing the three specifications, 7 
through 9, we can see that model 8 has a better goodness of fit.  
So given model 8, as the judicial system quality index increases by one unit, efficiency 
score increases by 0.2 percent. An increase of one unit in Economic Freedom Index will make 
the score go up by almost 12 percent. Also states with Republican majority in legislature, on 
average have 5 percent higher efficiency score than state with Democrat majority. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Empirical studies in different levels confirm that better institutions can provide a basis upon 
which economic activities and policies can be delivered better. In general institutions matter and 
they impact the development through different channels.  
This paper examines the relationship between institutional set-up and government 
spending efficiency in the U.S. states. After using a non-parametric method, we calculate the 
efficiency score for each state. This number simply represents that relative to all other states, 
how efficiently one state spends its general expenditure. The considered outputs for 
governments‘ fiscal policy are higher growth and more equally distributed income. 
Our final finding shows that higher quality of judicial system and less regulatory labor 
market are positively associated with the public spending efficiency. The political affiliations of 
legislature and executives have mixed results depending on the specification. However there is 
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empirical evidence that show, states with republican legislature have more efficient government 





























9Table A3.1: List of States with Right-to-Work 
State Year Constitutional Amendment Adopted Year Status Enacted 
Alabama  1953 
Arizona   1946 1947 
Arkansas   1944 1947 
Florida   1968 1943 
Georgia  1947 
Idaho  1985 
Indiana State law, 2012  
Iowa  1947 
Kansas 1958  
Louisiana  1976 
Michigan  State law, 2012  
Mississippi  1960 1954 
Nebraska 1946 1947 
Nevada 1952 1951 
North Carolina  1947 
North Dakota 1948 1947 
Oklahoma 2001 2001 
South Carolina  1954 
South Dakota 1946 1947 
Tennessee  1947 
Texas  1993 
Utah  1955 
Virginia  1947 
Wyoming  1963 
 
10Table. A3.2: Component Areas of Economic Freedom of North America Index 
Area 1: Size of Government 
EFAI: Govt. consumption expenditures as a percentage of GSP  
EFAII: Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GSP  
EFAIII: Employment insurance, workers compensation, and other pensions as a percentage of 
GSP  
 
Area 2: Takings and Discriminatory Taxation 
EFBI: Total Tax Burden as a Percentage of GSP: Includes income taxes, consumption taxes, 
property and sales taxes, contributions to Social Security plans, and other taxes 
EFBII: Top marginal income tax rate and the income threshold at which it applies  
 
Area 3: Labor Market Freedom 
EFCI: Minimum wage legislation: Annual income earned by an minimum-wage worker divided 
by per- capita GSP 
EFCII: Government employment as a percentage of total employment  




Table 3. 1: Descriptive Statistics and Sources 
 Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source* 
Out-puts    
 
   
GROWTH
 
GDP per capita annual growth: 1998-2005
 
2.01 2.08 -6.1 8.73 BEA 





   
 
GOVEXP 




4358.25 1394.34 2590.54 14293.02 USCB 
Institutional Quality 
 
     
Judicial System       
JUDQ Judicial System Quality: 2000-2005 59.10 8.62360 24.8 78.6 ILR 
Labor Market       
MEM % employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement (Union 
Density): 1998-2005 
17.23 8.64356 2.3 26.9 
Hirsch et al.(2003) – 
CPS 
RTW Dummy for Right-to-Work law: 1997-2005  0.443 0.496 0 1 DOL 
EFI3 Economic Freedom Index, Area3A: Labor market freedom: 1995-2005 6.587 0.912 5.7 8.7 Fraser Institute 
Political Affiliation       
EXPOL Dummy for governors‘ political affiliation 
(1=Republican, 0=Otherwise): 1997-2005 
0.544 0.498 0 1 NGA 
LEGPOL 
Dummy for legislature political affiliation 
(1=Republican, 0=Otherwise): 1997-2005 
0.451 0.497 0 1 NSCL 
Note: LEGPOL is combined of two parts for senate and house of representatives.  
Dummy for majority of state senators political affiliation (1= Republics, 0=Otherwise) : Upper House 
Dummy for majority of state representative political affiliation (1= Republics, 0=Otherwise): Lower House 
LEGPOL sums the two to one single variable. 
* USCB: U.S. Census Bureau;  ILR: Institute for Legal Reform-U.S. Chamber of Commerce; CPS: Current Population Survey; DOL: Department of Labor; NSCL: National 
Conference of State Legislatures; NGA: National Governors Association 
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11Table 3.2: DEA efficiency Score Results 
State Rank Score State Rank Score 
Alabama 19 0.858605 Montana 38 0.674764 
Alaska 49 0.284865 Nebraska 13 0.917713 
Arizona 1 1 Nevada 14 0.900145 
Arkansas 23 0.808817 New Hampshire 8 0.939656 
California 40 0.644066 New Jersey 39 0.669249 
Colorado 11 0.922843 New Mexico 44 0.605133 
Connecticut 46 0.550338 New York 47 0.498708 
Delaware 43 0.612993 North Carolina 15 0.873438 
Florida 10 0.935968 North Dakota 34 0.727558 
Georgia 7 0.958467 Ohio 22 0.812861 
Hawaii 45 0.598762 Oklahoma 20 0.856174 
Idaho 1 1 Oregon 33 0.729146 
Illinois 18 0.862171 Pennsylvania 26 0.785606 
Indiana 4 0.986195 Rhode Island 37 0.678885 
Iowa 16 0.871033 South Carolina 30 0.747209 
Kansas 12 0.919886 South Dakota 2 0.999569 
Kentucky 24 0.798556 Tennessee 3 0.990624 
Louisiana 25 0.798416 Texas 6 0.976008 
Maine 32 0.745318 Utah 21 0.825933 
Maryland 17 0.869091 Vermont 42 0.6228 
Massachusetts 41 0.631095 Virginia 9 0.936366 
Michigan 31 0.746541 Washington 35 0.700492 
Minnesota 36 0.694067 West Virginia 29 0.750736 
Mississippi 28 0.760939 Wisconsin 27 0.776634 
Missouri 5 0.978236 Wyoming 48 0.493295 
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12Table 3.3: OLS Regression Result; Dependent Variable: Efficiency Score: pooled 1998-2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 0.612 0.874 -0.129 0.635 0.698 0.659 0.818 -0.260 0.588 
 (8.88)** (28.54)** (-1.06) (36.17)** (32.11)** (33.86)** (12.29)** (-2.17)* (8.34)** 
Judicial System Quality (JUD) 0.003 
(2.29)* 






          
Percent employees member of union(MEM) ----- -0.015 
(-6.54)** 
----- ----- ----- ----- -0.013 
(-7.49)** 
----- ----- 
          
Economic Freedom Index-Area3 (EFI3) ----- ----- 0.119 
(6.77)** 
----- ----- ----- ----- 0.124 
(9.38)** 
----- 
          
Right-to-Work (RTW) ----- ----- ----- 0.129 ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.129 
    (4.89)**     (6.04)** 








          








          
Observations 200 450 450 450 439 441 193 193 193 
R-squared 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.37 0.23 
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Several pioneer social scientists such as John Stuart Mill, Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber 
promoted the general idea of the ―secularization theory‖. The core of this theory is that, in the 
modern world, importance of religion in the political sphere would decline. In other words it 
claims religion would be marginalized from public to the private sector (Nordas, 2005). 
However in recent decades almost all over the globe we can observe the empowerment of 
religion, particularly in the political scenes. As Haynes (1997) discusses, almost all countries 
around the world have been experiencing some sort of political tension with the background of 
religious dispute. There are a large number of real examples that let us think secularization 
theory has been strongly challenged
14
.  For example Gill & Keshavarzian (1999) find that 
opposite of what ―old-line secularization thesis‖ claims, religious organizations and leaders 
remain or are becoming increasingly active in political and social life. This transmits into the 
mobility of the adherents and followers to taking action. Majority of ethno-religious conflicts are 
originated from this idea.  Casanova (1994) refers to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, as a 
key point that shifted religion back into the public contestation. He argues that besides Iranian 
revolution, the rise of solidarity movement in Poland, role of Catholicism in Sandinista and 
Evangelicalism in American politics were all developments that somewhat negate the idea of 
secularization even further. These changes all continue after the cold war up until very recent 
―war on terror‖.  
                                                          




There is no doubt that religion have distinctive role in some of the most repeated conflict 
zones of the world. For example the bloody conflicts in Algeria, Chechnya, Kashmir, Nigeria, 
Northern Ireland, Israel–Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan and Sri Lanka, and the civil war in 
Afghanistan (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000; Fox, 2000; Seul, 1999).  Although we cannot state 
that these incidences were all exclusively religious conflicts, but clearly some religious factors 
have been in the heart of the confrontations
15
.  
Considering all of these and so many other events that have happened in the recent 
decades, religion has become one of the most attractive topics in the academic studies and public 
debates on conflict. Not religion per se, but more precisely religion and its functions in political 
and social changes.  
The current paper looks into the impact of religion on the domestic societal conflicts in 
countries. It investigates two questions, one which has been raised in the related studies before 
and one new question to the literature. In both of the questions, focus is on the religious 
heterogeneity of countries. In the first hypothesis, the impact of religious diversity on the 
magnitude of conflict is tested. In the second one, role of government and its religious identity is 
included in the analysis. Particularly I want to see if the level of religiosity of state impacts the 
connection between religious diversity of a society and the magnitude of conflict. 
The main contribution of this paper is its research question which has not been examined 
before. Correlation between conflict and different types of heterogeneity, e.g. ethno-lingual and 
cultural, have been studied, but religious diversity is rarely being paid attention to. Moreover, as 
the more important part of the contribution, role of state religiosity, up to my knowledge, has not 
                                                          
15 On a different intensity level but yet similar forcing mechanism, we can refer to a large part of political 
instability and social movements in the Middle East in past four years, known as Arab Spring, with focusing 




been included in this analysis before. Also the expansion of data set by number of countries and 
time span is another contribution.  
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents related studies with the focus on 
theoretical background. Section 3 is about the variables and data used in the model. A brief 
explanation of empirical method is presented in section 4, and it is followed by empirical 
analysis of results. Finally section 6 is the conclusion. 
4.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Argument 
In the past half-century almost one third of the nations around the world have experienced some 
level of civil war or political unrest. Blattman and Miguel (2010) show that since 1960 twenty 
percent of countries have had at least ten years of civil war and that portion has steadily 
increased peaking in 1990s. Some examples of Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia can represent 
the depth and length of these instabilities. 
Due to the significance of this important issue, there has been a well-established literature 
on the concept of conflict in general and moreover the roles of socio-economic determinants of 
it. Ethnicity, culture and religion have been magnified within this literature. Political scientists 
and sociologists primarily, and economists to some extend have studied conflict.  
The literature on conflict theorizes three main conditions under which (religious) groups 
would participate in violent actions. First is the issue of social frustration. Gurr (1993) argues 
that one main reason for societal violence with the religious background is when one or several 
(religious) minorities face deprivation circumstances for a period of time. This may ultimately 
erupt in form of social mobilization which has been originated from those frustrations (Dollard et 
al., 1939; Galtung, 1964).  
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Second, the essential factor that can increase the risk of conflict is the access of groups to 
resources. Basically if there are potential rebel groups which have reached to a certain level of 
social frustration, but no access to enough resources to mobilize their members, they cannot 
initiate any serious violent action. Gradually these rebel groups with no resource would die out 
(Tilly, 1978). So having enough opportunity and sufficient access to resources are key factors for 
an actual initiation of violent action. 
Finally, a primary step in the formation of groups is conflicting identity. When a person‘s 
individual identity sets in line with its group identity, an individual as a member can possibly be 
mobilized to take action for the group. However this depends on a long list of parameters, one of 
which is the size of the group. Now if the society as a large group fails to keep a stable group 
identity (e.g. national identity), threat of violence and defensive actions will rise (Stryker and 
Burke, 2000; Bloom, 1990). The separation of individual and group identities is fairly common, 
but considering an identity (particularly an identity with religious theme) for members of a big 
group, such as population of a country, is very complicated and almost impossible (Seul, 1999).  
The two conditions of identity differences and frustration are the more important 
backbones of ethno-religious conflicts throughout the history. I focus on these two segments of 






4.2.1 Confrontation of Identities and Conflict 
Nordås (2004) categorizes the perspectives in understanding of identity (in political analysis) to 
three main groups: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. 
Some social scientists have more primordialistic view to identity and claim that cultural 
factors such as ethnicity or religion are fixed characteristics of groups. For example Vanhanen 
(2000) argues that group identities are stable basis when analyzing conflicts. Hasenclever and 
Ritterger (2000) claim that primordialists refer to difference among religious traditions as the 
major explanatory variable for violent interaction among nations. The famous theory of ―clash of 
civilization‖ by Huntington (1993) is one of the most important theoretical studies that embrace 
primordialistic view. He sees ethno-cultural differences among countries to be rooted in the 
relatively constant differences among civilizations (that countries originally belonged to). 
Furthermore he argues that conflicts in the twenty first century are going to be all based on these 
differences, and segregations or alliances will continue to grow on basis of these differences. 
There are some criticisms against this view of identity in the context of conflict. Smith 
(1996) brings up the lack of parameters of time and location in the primordialistic paradigm. He 
argues that without theoretical explanation on specific incidences, we cannot generalize the 
reasons for conflict to the differences in identities. Pfaff (1993) gives multiple examples on 
historical peaceful relations between nations with not only different, but also confronting 
identities (e.g. some countries in Balkan and Sub-Saharan states) (Welsh, 1996; Newbury, 1983; 
Lamarchand, 1972). 
Opposite of primodialistic view, there is a paradigm of instrumentalism which looks at 
identity differences as an instrument in the hands of states (political power) to achieve social or 
economic goals (Nordas, 2004). In this perspective, religious identities play significant roles 
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leading conflicts only if religion (as a whole) is manipulated by political power. Carment(1993)  
assumes conflict (by any background or nature) is a function of political differences rather than 
ethnic, cultural or religious heterogeneity.  
So in summary we can say that, these two views have a fundamental difference. While 
primodialists think that difference in identities per se, is the source of conflict, instrumentalists 
believe there are so many other factors (bundled in social/political benefits) that play roles in a 
conflict situation.  
Connecting these two views is the constructivism perspective. This paradigm offer a 
middle point position, where identity differences are the key initiator of conflict, but the action of 
political power is perceived as the catalyst for violent instabilities (Nordas, 2004). 
Constructivists believe that the combination of both power-seeking of ethnic/religious groups 
together with bad policies would lead the situation to a violent conflict. This view seems to be 
growing among academicians and social scientists more than the other two views (Hasenclever 
and Rittberge, 2000). 
Based on these three main categories of theories about identity differences and 
heterogeneity and its relationship to conflict, I propose the first hypothesis of the paper.  
H1: Countries with higher degree of religious heterogeneity face higher chance of 
conflict. 
This statement is directly based on primodialistic view and can be contradicted by other two 
perspectives. This hypothesis has not been tested extensively in the literature. Most of the 
research on conflict consider some sort of ethnic fractionalization in their analysis and not 
specifically religious diversity (Gurr, 2000; Horwitz, 2000; Nordas, 2004). Besides some 
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technical and empirical set-up, one important issue that changes the result of testing this 
hypothesis in the literature is how to define the heterogeneity. As Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2004) show, using index of fractionalization or index for polarization makes a big difference in 
the result. Fractionalization index is directly a function of how many different groups exist in a 
society, as opposed to the polarization index that refers to how many large groups of minority are 
in a country. In other word, polarization in a society is very high when there are few (in extreme 
case, two) groups of different religious identities with political/social power. Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2004) develop this comparison for ethnicity variable and not religion. 
4.2.2 Minorities’ Frustration 
The idea that ethnic/religious groups‘ frustration transits into violent action, was originated by 
Aristotle (Ellina and Moore, 1990). Simply he argues that groups with limited share of power, 
start developing frustration through time and this, given sufficient opportunity and resources, 
would accumulate in a confrontation with the power. So with this view existence of a political 
power, state, is taken for granted and the state confronts the ideology (here religion) of the 
minority groups. Dollard et al. (1939) is the premier advocate of this view and followed by them 
there have been researchers who focus on this aspect of social violence (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 
1970; Feierabend, 1966).  
 There is a plethora of examples in the literature of conflict that show how this frustration 
which has roots in discrimination or in general contradicting identity with the power, leads to 
political actions (Gurr, 2000) .Wentz (1987) argues when a group‘s religious view is threatened, the 
natural reaction would be defensive action which sometimes occurs without considering the cost of 
it. Geertz (1966) similarly argues that religious belief systems to some extent define individual‘s 
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identity, and will provoke a reaction when it is under threats . Religious discrimination, similar to 
other types of discrimination, leads to frustration and grievances, which can initiate a violent conflict.  
The main hypothesis of the paper is based on this section of theory.  As it is obvious, the 
idea of discrimination and the frustration that comes with it can be studies and analyzed when we 
include a major and important player, government. Governments‘ view on religion can be set on 
spectrum. On one extreme, fully secular state which embraces all religious views and tolerates 
practices, and on the other far end we would have governments with official religion and 
distinctive religious view and zero tolerance for alternative ideology/faith and practices. Having 
this in the perspective, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: In countries with religious state in power, higher religious heterogeneity is 
associated with higher risk of conflict. 
So H2 is essentially an amendment to H1, by adding governments‘ religious view. In a 
society which one (or some) religion is declared as the religion of the country and there is 
limitation for practicing other faiths, minorities start to accumulate frustration due to deprivation 
they are facing. Ultimately when there are more frustrated religious groups, this possibly would 
turn to a violent conflict. The difference between this hypothesis and the previous one is that in 
the first statement, there is no notion of isolation and deprivation of religious groups, therefore 
no frustration-based mechanism would act to facilitate the confrontation. But in H2 the 
difference in identities is not the forcing factor, rather it is the dictation of state over religious 
groups that acts as a catalyst for conflict in diverse societies.  
One important issue about this hypothesis is that how we define the religiosity of state. 
Friedland (2001) claims that constitutional notion of religion is relatively a good measure on how 
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religious a government is. This claim however can be criticized from some different aspects. I 
will explain it in the methodology part. But in short probably it is safe to say one parsimonious 
indicator of religiosity of a state is if the state has an official religion or not.  
4.3 Variables and Data 
In this section I explain all the variables involved in this project and the data used for them. 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics and the sources. I use the pooled sample of 128 countries 
for the time range between 1990 to 2004. 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable: Conflict 
There is a large literature of quantitative studies with a focus on conflict in the country level. In 
these studies it is crucial to define conflict clearly, since a small change in the dependent 
variable‘s definition, changes the whole argument. Some studies focus on the onset of conflict 
episodes, such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002) or Fearon and Laitin (2003). Some others study the 
incidence of conflict (for example as a dummy that represents if any violent act has happened in 
a certain year or not). Russett and Oneal (2003) based their argument on this aspect. Finally there 
are studies that are concerned about duration of conflict (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). 
In this paper however I rely on the magnitude of conflict. The dependent variable is 
designed to represent the magnitude of societal conflicts. Center for Systematic Peace (CSP) has 
conducted a project, Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), which has a comprehensive 
list of all major conflicts from 1946 to 2006. Among all the variables, I use four and construct 
the dependent variable from them; magnitude of civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and 
ethnic war. The magnitude of these incidences is calculated in the scale of 0 to 10 based on the 
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level of destruction, number of people dead or injured and population displaced.
16
 The dependent 
variable, conflict, is the total civil and ethnic violence and warfare. It can be simply constructed 
by summing the four variables (However, it is provided by the MPEV and I used the included 
variable instead of summing). Therefore it has the value between 0 to 40, as it gets larger it refers 
to a more destructive and violent incidence. 
4.3.2 Religious Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity, as mentioned in the theory part, can be calculated differently. In general in the 
literature, there are three main dimensions by which heterogeneity of a society can be 




The first one, as extendedly used in different literature, is defined as the probability that 
two individuals randomly selected from a society, would belong to different (religious) groups. 
Following gini-simpson index, it is calculated as follows. I call this measure diversity (for the 
purpose of this paper, religious diversity). 
             ∑   
  
     
Where,    refers to the share of group i from the total population. The value of this index falls 
between 0 and 1. As it gets larger, it means the society is more diverse. 
Polarization however, is different from fractionalization by weighting heterogeneity 
higher when there are few large groups, and not several small ones. 
                                                          
16 A complete explanation of dependent variable and how it is constructed can be found in the Appendix 
section. 
17 Dominance can be measured as the percentage of the population belonging to the largest group. 
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Where    is the share of group i. So for example if there are two main religious groups in a 
country where each of them has half of the population as members, then that society is extremely 
polarized but is it would have diversity equal to 0.5.  Therefore fractionalization (as I refer to by 
diversity) and polarizations refer to somewhat similar issue but they have fundamental 
difference. One example to show the difference between these two measures would be the cases 
of United States and Lebanon. The U.S. has a high rate of diversity as it has several somewhat 
similar size religious groups, but a low rate of polarization. In Lebanon in contrast, there are two 
major religious group of almost the same size. In this case the society is religiously polarized in 
two groups. 
Besides the measure issue, we should be clear what do we mean by religious group. One 
might separate religious groups by looking only at the major world religions. Alternatively, 
we can consider specific religious groups within these world religions. This last way of 
investigating religious diversity implies, for example, separating between Catholics and 
Protestant Christians, and between Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims.   Both of these two 
categorizations can be valid and important, based on the case of study. There are examples of 
conflict occurring between religious sub-groups, such as in Northern Ireland, and tension 
between the Sunni and the Shi‘a population in several countries, e.g. Iraq,  Afghanistan and 
what we are observing in Syria now.  However, Huntington (1993) argues that the conflict 
lines after the Cold War would be between different civilizations defined primarily in terms of 
world religions. The cultural content is also often more similar within world religions than 
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between them. There are also several examples of conflicts occurring between groups 
belonging to different world religions, such as the conflicts in Kashmir,  Sudan and Israel-
Palestine. Although Huntignton‘s idea can be criticized in the real world by the numerous 
conflicts which have been happening in the past decade, I use the world religion data instead of 
sub-groups. 
 Data from World Religion Dataset (WRD) provided by Association of Religion Data 
Archives (ARDA) is employed. The main part used for the purpose of calculation the 
heterogeneity factors, are the percentages of population belonged to different religious groups. 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism are the main world religion considered. Besides these, all 
other groups are included in one ―Other‖ group. Also there is a non-religious group as well.  The 
adherence rates of these groups in countries for the period of time considered in this paper, do 
not present significant variations.  
4.3.3 State Religiosity 
There have been some scattered studies on the notion of religion in the political structure 
(Friedland, 2001). But it can be claimed that the most robust and complete quantitative study on 
the topic has been done by Jonathan Fox (Fox, 2000; Fox, 2003; Fox, 2004). These papers are all 
built upon the extensive research, The Religion and State (RAS) project, which examines 
constitutional and state arrangements toward religion. This project includes a long list of 
variables for 169 states between year 1990 and 2008. 
In the previous section it was briefly mentioned that role of state in the religious market 
and also its religious identity, is very significant when we are including such important sector, 
government, to the analysis. In this paper for constructing one variable that captures different 
aspects of state in the religion issues, I consider three components. All of them in one way or the 
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other influence the frustration channel that was presented in the theoretical part. These 
components are basically three areas in RAS that I believe can help us to understand ―how 
religious‖ a country‘s government is. Existence of a (or some) official religion, declaration of the 
fact that the state is a religious state, and finally the level of religious freedom in the country, are 
the three variables by which state religiosity is assessed. All the factors are taken from Religion 
and State (RAS) project database. Like religious heterogeneity, these variables are quite static 
and do not present significant variations through time. Here I explain each of them. 
Official religion (OFF) 
In the RAS database there are multiple variables regarding the status of official religion in the 
constitution. For example if there are more than one religion recognized as the official, if there is 
any bias toward either one, if there is a clause indicating any officiality for notion of religion, etc. 
Here I simply rely on the variable that shows whether there is at least one religion declared to be 
the official religion.  This dummy variable takes value of one in the case of existence of at least 
one official religion in the state, and it gets zero otherwise.  The primary empirical procedure to 
test the main hypothesis relies on this variable. It means that the basic measure of state religiosity 
is this variable. 
Religious State (RS) 
This variable is another dummy that shows if the state is declared as a religious state. The key 
criterion for this measure is the notion in the constitution of a section that declares for example 
state X is an Islamic country.  Like the previous factor it has binary value of 1 or 0. In case of 





Religious Freedom (FREE) 
Besides the overall constitutional representation of state‘s position with regard to religion, the 
actual regulations and treatment toward religious groups are important factors that determine 
states‘ religiosity. For this purpose, I consider five variables from RAS. They are all dummy 
variables on the restrictions that constitution and governments‘ actions set on different religious 
sectors.  
0 = the restriction does not exist 
1 = the restriction exists  
1) Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion 
2) Restrictions on personal status regarding marriage, divorce, burial, and inheritance 
3) Restrictions on building, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship, including  
    restrictions on holding religious meetings in private homes. 
4) Restrictions on proselytizing 
5) Mandatory religious education 
The overall freedom variable is the sum of these five dummies. This will result in a variable for 
religious freedom that gets values between 0 (least restriction, most free) to 5(most restriction, 
least free). 
Now, first only the official religion variable (OFF) will be considered in the regression 
analysis and then as a robustness check, I look into a more comprehensive state religiosity 
variable. That will be the sum of three variables presented: OFF, RS and FREE. Then I add 
these three criteria together to have a proxy for state religiosity, a variable which takes value 




4.3.4 Control Variables 
Without considering different characteristics of countries, we cannot deliver a sound argument 
for testing the hypotheses. Therefore a set of covariates are included in the regressions. Based on 
major research works in the literature of conflict, all these variables seems to have important 
impact on conflict incidences (Ellingsen, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003). 
Economic Characteristics 
 GDP per Capita and GDP per Capita Growth 
There is a robust consensus in the literature that suggests significant relationship between 
economic performance and risk of conflict. Researchers analyze this relationship from 
different aspects. For example Hergre et al. (2001) argues that overall better economic 
condition makes the establishment of institutions for peace between groups more feasible. De 
Soysa (2002) claims that when economy is doing better government can collect higher 
revenue and therefore provide better peaceful environment. Based on the same lines of 
argument, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoffler (2002) suggest a negative 
association between economic development and conflict. 
Very similar to the reasoning for inclusion of GDP per capita, growth of this variable can 
be included in the model with expectation of having a negative correlation to the dependent 
variable. Gurr (1970) argues that regardless of initial level of wealth, lower level of growth 




I use GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars. The data is from World Development 
Indicator (WDI) of World Bank. The variable is log transformed and lagged by one year. 
Lagged growth rate of GDP per capita from WDI is included in the models as well. 
 Gini Index 
One key issue in the rising of conflict among groups is the difference in their socio-economic 
status. As the differences rise, the possibility of confrontation of the groups increases. Hergre 
et al. (2001) refers to this expectation under the theory of deprivation, which claims 
minorities accumulate frustration increasingly due to expansion of segregation between 
classes.  
In the context of economic status, gini index, which captures the inequality of income 
distribution, can represent the gaps between groups. Datafor this index gathered from The 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (2008) by Frederik Solt. 
Political and Institutional Characteristics 
 Institutional Quality 
In the literature of development economics, it has been repeatedly shown that institutions 
have significant role in different socioeconomic aspects of any society. One can think of a 
nation with low quality institutions, particularly an inefficient legal system where property 
rights are not well protected, and rationalize a high possibility of conflict among groups. 
When judicial system does not work properly and the specific role of government to enforce 
the law is not delivered, it is likely that groups with conflicting goals start violent actions.  
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 For this reason an indicator of institutional quality, Economic Freedom of the World 
Index, by Gwartney, Hall and Lawson (2011), is considered as another control variable. Note 
that this index consists of 5 main areas on size of government, legal structure, access to 
sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations in labor market and businesses. Here I only 
include the second component on legal structure and security of property rights.
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 Regime Type 
The political model of a country can play an important role in preventing a society from conflict 
(Eckstein and Gurr, 1975). We can consider democratic versus autocratic systems as two 
extremes and multiple midpoint regimes as the usual alternatives in the real world.  The common 
sense might dictates that democracies would be less prone to conflict and violence. Basically 
there are various channels through which democracy can be related to lower level of conflict. As 
Ellingsen (2000) and Rummel (1995) argue, democracy provides the institutions for peaceful 
relation among groups within a society. But on the other hand there is a valid argument which 
states, since democracy gives the relative freedom to minorities to promote their ideas and 
values, naturally confrontation of identities will be more pronounced and that may cause violent 
conflicts (Auvinen, 1997).  Overall regime type is an essential variable to be included in order to 
explain the conflict. Like multiple studies in the realm of political analysis of conflict, I use 
PolityIV index. This index consists of three main components (political market competitiveness, 
openness of excusive, and the restriction on the chief executive) and it gets value between  
-10(least democratic) to 10(most democratic). PolityIV is the product of a project called with 
same name conducted by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. I used the data from the report in 2011. 
 
                                                          





Size of population can impact the propensity to violent action based on several hypotheses. A 
large population size by nature means more diverse set of ideas; it can be belief or faith issue 
or only personal values. Also countries with larger population usually are more expanded 
geographically. This makes the control of possible confrontations difficult. Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) argue that higher population means more layers of social and political classes, and 
this can increase the propensity to collide as well. For all these reasons, log transform of 
population of countries is included in the model and it is expected to positively impact the 
dependent variable.  
 New State 
States that just newly got their independence usually need some time to structure the 
institutions and be completely consolidated. Some studies, such as Hegre et al. (2001) or 
Fearon and Laitin (2001, 2003) show that these states are more prone to conflict. The 
underlying reasoning for this is the potential of empowering the rebel groups in an unstable 
environment. Some of these rebel groups can be the groups rooted in the previous regime in 
power. In any case, the duration of settlement of a stable system in a country seems to be a 
relevant variable to include in analysis of conflict (Nordas, 2004). Hence, I have included a 
dummy variable for the first two years of independence.  The dummy gets value equal to 
one if the state has gotten its independence in the past two years and it gets zero otherwise. 




 Oil Exporter 
Some studies in the literature (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Nordas, 2004) find that oil 
exporting countries face higher risk of conflict. The theoretical justification for such behavior 
is the idea of resource curse and political Dutch disease. As a controlling power has the 
ultimate ownership of resources, such as oil, motivation of left-out groups to become part of 
rebel organizations will increase. The variable in the regressions here is from Fearon and 
Laitin (2003). It is a dummy which gets value equal one when more than one third of state 
revenue is from oil and otherwise it is equal zero. 
4.4 Methodology 
The basis of empirical method is regression analysis. To present testing the two hypotheses of 
the paper, I looked at ten different specifications. The general form of model would be as 
follows: 
                                                  
Where, RH is measure of religious heterogeneity, SR is represents state religiosity and X is a 
matrix of control variables. 
An important note that should be pointed out here is about the statistical model I picked 
to use. As discussed in the variable and data section, the dependent variable, magnitude of 
conflict, can only take values of between 0 to 40. Also there are around 40 percent of the 
countries that in different years have the conflict variable equal to zero
19
. These limitations make 
the possibility of bias and inconsistency of ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients estimate 
increase. That is why instead of OLS, I rely on Tobit model and estimates of Maximum 
                                                          
19
 For 47 countries the conflict variable is almost constantly equal to zero. 
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Likelihood. Nordas (2004) which uses the same dependent variable implements Tobit model. 
The Tobit model is a double-sided model with upper limit of 40 and lower limit of 0. 
4.5 Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
H1: Hypothesis 1 
In table 4.2, the results for testing the first hypothesis are presented. Model (1) and (3) are simple 
bivariate relationships between two measures of religious heterogeneity, religious diversity and 
polarization, and magnitude of conflict in countries. In the bivariate relationships, it seems that 
only polarization shows significant positive impact on conflict while religious diversity does not 
have any statistically significant relationship.  That can be translated as, if there are few large 
religious groups; conflict would happen with larger magnitude compared to the situation when 
there are large numbers of small and diverse religious groups. However, when I include the set of 
control variables (Model 2 and 4), both of these measures of heterogeneity loose the significance. 
  Therefore for the first hypothesis, when we are just simply looking at the bivariate 
relationships, it seems that countries with polarized religious society tend to have more frequent 
conflict. But it is not necessarily the case for fractionalized countries. This result is along with 
the literature‘s finding (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Nordas, 2004). But it cannot be reliable, since 
the specification is missing all the important control variables. 
 When we consider model (2) and (4), there is not enough evidence to support the 
hypothesis, neither for fractionalized nations nor for polarized. So in summary, for this sample 
under study, hypothesis one can statistically be rejected, confirming the disconnection between 
religious heterogeneity and conflict.  
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H2: Hypothesis 2 
For testing the second hypothesis, first we need to include the state religiosity variable. At this 
level the simple dummy variable regarding the existence of official religion in the constitution 
(OFF) is considered for state religiosity. Table 4.3 presents the results regarding the second 
hypothesis. The first column, model 5, shows the bivariate regression results for state religiosity. 
The coefficient is statistically insignificant. So based on this simple regression we cannot 
comment on the relationship that state religiosity might have with the magnitude of conflict. 
Even after including control variables, in model 6, we still do not observe any significance for 
the coefficient. But the negative sign is interesting to pay attention to. It simply claims that 
having official religion is associated with less conflict. This relationship is not particularly in the 
interest of testing hypothesis 2.  Therefore for testing the second hypothesis, four specifications, 
models 7 to 10, are presented.  
 More specifically model 8 and 10 are the ones used to test the hypothesis. In both of these 
specifications, an interaction variable is included. Model 8 is for polarization and model 10 for 
religious diversity. Coefficient of the interaction term in model 8 is 2.94. This means that if we 
have two countries one with official religion and one secular, a unit increase in the polarization 
measure for the two countries make the conflict to have almost 3 units of magnitude higher in the 
religious state than the secular country.  So basically it seems that official religion in countries 
act as a catalyst that makes impact of polarization on conflict magnified.  
 Exactly the same interaction variable is used for religious diversity in model 10. However 
the coefficient here is not statistically significant. From this we can claim that state religious 
status does not impact the relationship between religious diversity and conflict. 
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 Model 7 and 9 are similar to model six with addition of religious heterogeneity measures. 
One important issue in these two models is the insignificance of both religious heterogeneity 
variables. Also it seems that official religion in the constitution negatively impacts the conflict 
magnitude. As discussed in the previous section, the theoretical explanation for this relationship 
can be due to lower political and social power of religious minority groups. In the case of 
existence of a religious state, minorities may have less access to resources and opportunities to 
mobilize the adherents. 
 Control variables show different behaviors, some confirming the expectation and some 
falsifying them. For example among three economic characteristics included, gini shows 
significant relationship, but opposite of expectation. Negative sign of the coefficient, states that 
as the income inequality increases, magnitude of conflict decreases. But the negative sign of 
GDP per capita coefficient shows that as income of individuals increase, we would see less 
conflict. This is along the expectation. Institutional quality by Economic Freedom Index, 
presents the expected behavior. The better institutions are, the less conflict we would see. 
However the regime type in general does not present significant relationship. Population is 
positively related to conflict. The duration of independence of countries negatively impacts the 
conflict magnitude. 
For robustness check, I run the same sets of specifications, model 5 through 10, for a 
more comprehensive variable of state religiosity. As explained in the previous sections, the three 
measures of state religiosity: official religion, declaration of religious state, and religious 
freedom are combined by summing them up (STATREL). This variable gets values between 0 
and 7, and as it increases it refers to higher state religiosity. Since the additional two 
components, declaration of religiosity and religious freedom are included, it should be noted that 
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this variable is essentially measuring a different concept. In the real world, there are countries, 
which have secular state but religious freedom are not in the ―best‖ level. Or there are also 
countries which have official religion, but the regulations embrace other faiths and provide 
freedom for their adherents. So STATEREL simply gives a broad picture of importance of 
religion in the government. 
After running the models with the new variable, essentially the same results with minor 
variations in magnitude and significance can be observed. Results of different specification with 
this variable are presented in table 4.4. 
One point worth mentioning is the change in the log-liklihood magnitude among different 
specifications.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper examines role of state religiosity in conflict. Previous literature lacks this aspect when 
analyzing heterogeneity of societies. The main research question here is, whether level of state‘s 
religiosity has any impact on relationship between religious heterogeneity and conflict. Basically 
I want to investigate whether religious heterogeneity in countries with different state religiosity 
impacts conflict differently.  
After controlling for a set of covariates, Tobit regression results indicate that in countries 
with religious state, higher religious heterogeneity is associated with larger magnitude of 
conflict. It means that having a religious state facilitates the initiation of instability and increases 







Conflict Variable (CONF) 
The nature and intensity of conflict episodes are completely different across countries or even within one 
country in different times. For a comprehensive study like Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) a 
detailed categorizations is needed. As some episodes are quite complex and, in some cases, detailed 
information on the episode is quite limited; therefore, some cases are difficult to assign to a single 
category. Particularly problematic are the designations of societal (intrastate) conflicts as either ―civil‖ or 
―ethnic‖ as there is often a mixture of political and social identity attributes, especially in regard to 
episodes of greater magnitude and longer duration. In addition, some may see the distinction made in the 
compilation of episodes between violence and war as somewhat arbitrary. In making this distinction, 
information regarding the degree of militant organization, tactical and strategic characteristics, and 
expressed level of commitment to the use of violence are taken into consideration.  
In the description of dataset, it is noted by the authors: ―Those who are concerned about the validity of 
these distinctions should use the aggregated categories‖. This is particularly the variable I use in the 
paper. 
The main societal effects considered in MEPV for magnitude assessment of warfare and violence are as 
follow:  
- Human Resources: direct and indirect deaths, direct and indirect injuries, sexual crimes and 
intimidations 
- Population Dislocations: costs, traumas, inefficiencies and indirect impact associated with 
displacements (personal-safety, logistics, etc.) 
- Societal Network: damage and distortions to the fragile fabric of inter-personal associations and the 
disintegration of relationships and identities based on amity, trust, exchange, mutual-benefit, comity, 
reciprocity, and deferred gratification, relations necessary for the proper and effective functioning of 
normative systems (social cooperation, cohesion, coherence, and coordination in politico-legal, 
economic, professional, and socio-cultural sub-systems). 
- Environmental Quality: direct and indirect damage and destruction to general ecosystem; use or 
release of explosive, corrosive, and devegative chemical compounds and mechanical devices that 
limit utilization of agricultural resources, foul surface and subterranean water resources, pollute 
atmosphere, disseminate toxic substances, and destroy wildlife and habitats. 
- Infrastructure Damage: direct and indirect damage, destruction, and over-consumption of material 
and mechanical infrastructure, resources, and surpluses such as production facilities, storage, 
transport networks, vehicles, water supplies, croplands, food, medical supplies, etc. 
 
Based on these areas of impacts, warfare magnitudes are categorized in 10 categories as follow (from the 
smallest magnitude to the highest): 
- Sporadic or Expressive Political Violence (01) 
- Limited Political Violence(02) 
- Serious Political Violence(03) 
- Serious Warfare(04) 
- Substantial and Prolonged Warfare(05) 
- Extensive Warfare(06) 
- Pervasive Warfare(07) 
- Technological Warfare(08) 
- Total Warfare(09) 






13Table A4.1:The Areas and Components of the EFW Index 
Area 1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 
A :General government consumption spending 
B :Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
C :Government enterprises and investment  
D :Top marginal tax rate: i: Top marginal income tax rate, ii: Top marginal income and payroll tax rate 
Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
 A Judicial independence (GCR) 
B :Impartial courts (GCR) 
C :Protection of property rights (GCR) 
D :Military interference in rule of law and the political process (CRG) 
E :Integrity of the legal system (CRG) 
F :Legal enforcement of contracts (DB) 
G :Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property (DB) 
Area 3: Access to Sound Money 
A:Money Growth 
B:Standard deviation of inflation 
C:Inflation: Most recent year 
D:Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts 
Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally 
A:Taxes on international trade 
i.International trade tax revenues (% of trade sector) 
ii.Mean tariff rate 
iii.Standard deviation of tariff rates 
B:Regulatory Trade Barriers 
i Non-tariff trade barriers (GCR) 
ii Compliance cost of importing and exporting (DB) 
C:Size of the trade sector relative to expected 
D:Black-market exchange rates 
E:International capital market controls 
i. Foreign ownership/investment restrictions (GCR) 
ii. Capital controls 
  
Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 
A: Credit market regulations 
 i.Ownership of banks 
 ii.Foreign bank competition 
 iii.Private sector credit 
 iv.Interest rate controls/Negative real interest rates 
B: Labor market regulations 
i.Minimum wage (DB) 
ii.Hiring and firing regulations (GCR) 
iii.Centralized collective bargaining (GCR) 
iv.Mandated cost of hiring (DB) 
v .Mandated cost of worker dismissal (DB) 
vi.Conscription 
C: Business Regulations 
i.Price controls 
ii.Administrative requirements (GCR) 
iii.Bureaucracy costs (GCR) 
iv .Starting a business (DB) 
v.Extra payments/Bribes (GCR) 
vi.Licensing restrictions (DB) 
vii.Cost of tax compliance (DB) 
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14Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Sources 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Source* 
Religion       
STATEREL, State religiosity Religiosity of State= OFF+ RS+FREE 0.21 1.47 0 7 Constructed 
Official Religion(OFF) =1 state has an official religion, =0 otherwise 0.18 0.38 0 1 RAS 
Religious State(RS) =1 if state declared as religious state, =0 
otherwise 
0.03 0.187 0 1 RAS 
Religious Freedom(FREE) Between 0 to 5. The higher means less freedom 1.32 1.59 0 5 RAS 
RELDIV Religious Fractionalization Index 0.30 0.22 0.004 0.98 Constructed, ARDA 
POLAR Religious Polarization Index 0.57 0.24 0.001 0.99 Constructed, ARDA 
Conflict       
CONF Magnitude of Conflict 0.72 1.68 0 17 Constructed, MEPV 
civviol Magnitude of civil violence involving state 0.05 0.39 0 4 MEPV 
civwar  Magnitude of civil warfare involving state 0.25   1.06 0 7 MEPV 
ethviol Magnitude of ethnic violence involving state 0.102 0.45 0 5 MEPV 
ethwar Magnitude of ethnic warfare involving state 0.304 1.12 0 10 MEPV 
       
Other Variables       
GDP Log of GDP per capita (constant 2000, US$) 7.77 1.64 4.05 11.59 World Bank-WDI 
GINI Gini index  38.31 9.68 16.87 69.78 WDI, SWIID 
GROWTH Growth of GDP per capita 2.006 6.35 -50.29 101.1 World Bank-WDI 
EFW2 Economic Freedom of the World Index 5.51 1.82 1.15 9.62 Fraser Institute 
REGIME PolityIV 2.89 6.70 -10 10 Polity IV Project 
POP Log of Population 15.48 2.11 9.2 21.01 World Bank-WDI 
NEWSTATE =1 if the country became independent in the 
past 2 years, =0 otherwise 
0.02 0.15 0 1 Fearon&Laitin (2003) 
OIL =1 if the country is Oil Exporter, =0 otherwise 0.15 0.34 0 1 Fearon&Laitin (2003) 
*RAS: Religion and State Project;  Association of Religion Data Archive; MEPV: Major episodes of political violence; WDI: World Bank-






15Table 4.2 :Tobit Regression Results; Dependent Variable: Magnitude of Conflict ; pooled observations 1990-2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Consant 0.890 -0.188 1.903 -2.188 
 (2.25)* (-1.37) (4.52)** (-0.41) 
Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV) -0.327 0.079 ------- ------- 
 (-0.90) (0.67)   
Polarization Index (POLAR) ------- ------- 0.398 0.258 
   (2.97)* (1.08) 
Log of GDP per Capita (GDP) ------- -0.004 ------- -0.005 
  (-2.04)*  (-2.54)* 
Gini Index (GINI) ------- -0.022 ------- -0.148 
  (-2.01)*  (-3.18)* 
GDP per Capita Growth (GROWTH) ------- 0.030 ------- 1.841 
  (1.34)  (0.25) 
Economic Freedom of the World Index-Area 2 
(EFW2) 
------- -0.517 ------- -1.695 
  (-6.33)**  (-5.22) 
Regime type-PolityIV (REGIME) ------- 0.030 ------- 0.094 
  (1.55)  (1.78) 
Log of Population (POP) ------- 0.329 ------- 0.412 
  (5.45)**  (4.21)** 
New State (NEWSTATE) ------- -2.584 ------- -3.045 
  (-3.21)**  (-2.89)** 
Oil Exporter ( OIL) ------- 0.395 ------- 0.386 
  (0.95)  (0.78) 
Observations 1920 890 1920 890 
Log Likelihood -910.229 -490.329 -907.658 -490.517 
Pseudo R-squared 0.049 0.324 0.051 0.648 




16Table 4.3: Tobit Regression Results; Dependent Variable:  Conflict 1990-2004 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant 1.721 1.212 1.123 1.018 1.115 1.021 
 (1.91) (0.92) (0.73) (0.81) (0.09) (0.15) 
Official Religion (OFF) -0.421 -0.312 -0.225 -0.751 -0.847 -0.712 
 (-0.95) (-1.53) (-1.91)* (-1.77) (-1.69) (-1.81) 
Polarization Index (POLAR) ------- ------- 0.082 0.258 ------- ------- 
   (1.02) (1.14)   
OFF*POLAR ------- ------- ------- 2.942 ------- ------- 
    (2.87)*   
Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV) ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.484 0.474 
     (1.11) (1.24) 
OFF*RELDIV ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 1.874 
      (1.46) 
Log of GDP per Capita (GDP) ------- -0.001 -0.032 -0.091 -0.102 -0.111 
  (-1.21) (-1.82) (-2.07)* (-1.81) (-2.14)* 
Gini Index (GINI) ------- -0.017 -0.019 -0.021 -1.027 -1.031 
  (-2.43)* (-2.54)* (-2.47)* (-1.98) (-2.99)** 
GDP per Capita Growth (GROWTH) ------- 0.007 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.028 
  (0.53) (0.61) (1.07) (1.08) (1.08) 
Economic Freedom of the World Index-Area 2 (EFW2) ------- -0.220 -0.285 -0.388 -0.545 -0.539 
  (-4.97)** (-4.47)** (-4.48)** (-3.99)** (-3.09)** 
Regime type-PolityIV (REGIME) ------- -0.028 -0.026 -0.020 -0.030 -0.032 
  (-1.97)* (-1.61) (-1.57) (-1.61) (-1.59) 
Log of Population (POP) ------- 0.219 0.294 0.294 0.280 0.277 
  (4.81)** (4.91)** (5.01)** (4.91)** (4.89)** 
New State (NEWSTATE) ------- -0.164 -1.012 -1.181 -1.097 -1.095 
  (-2.07)* (-2.07)* (-2.07)* (-2.08)* (-2.07)* 
Oil Exporter ( OIL) ------- 0.071 0.187 0.181 0.209 0.0211 
  (0.52) (0.81) (1.05) (1.04)* (1.05) 
Observations 1920 896 896 896 896 896 
Log Likelihood -852.125 -502.154 -498.542 -243.582 -448.714 -263.754 
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.457 0.492 0.664 0.581 0.654 




17Table 4.4: Tobit Regression Results; Dependent Variable:  Conflict 1990-2004 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant 1.247 -1.062 -1.110 1.022 1.175 1.112 
 (4.51)** (-0.72) (-0.73) (2.11)* (1.64) (2.18)* 
State Religiosity (STATEREL) 0.184 0.462 0.452 -0.941 -0.847 -1.048 
 (3.15)* (1.95) (2.81)* (-1.54) (-0.99) (-1.68) 
Polarization Index (POLAR) ------- ------- 0.058 -0.328 ------- ------- 
   (0.12) (-1.15)   
STATEREL*POLAR ------- ------- ------- 1.289 ------- ------- 
    (2.21)*   
Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV) ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.864 0.045 
     (1.24) (1.05) 
STATERE*RELDIV ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.998 
      (2.84)* 
Log of GDP per Capita (GDP) ------- -0.046 -0.043 -0.149 -0.112 -0.121 
  (-1.43) (-1.99)* (-2.04)* (-2.11)* (-2.41)* 
Gini Index (GINI) ------- -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 -1.021 -1.034 
  (-2.19)* (-2.10)* (-1.97)* (-1.99)* (-2.71)** 
GDP per Capita Growth (GROWTH) ------- 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.141 0.174 
  (0.99) (0.96) (1.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
Economic Freedom of the World Index-Area 2 (EFW2) ------- -0.396 -0.398 -0.396 -1.455 -1.614 
  (-4.85)** (-4.77)** (4.74)** (-2.09)** (-2.99)** 
Regime type-PolityIV (REGIME) ------- 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.079 0.147 
  (0.24) (0.26) (0.42) (1.51) (1.25) 
Log of Population (POP) ------- 0.329 0.329 0.333 0.471 0.557 
  (5.11)** (5.10)** (5.15)** (3.89)** (4.19)** 
New State (NEWSTATE) ------- -0.841 -1.021 -1.181 -0.171 -0.097 
  (-2.99)* (-2.08)* (-2.47)* (-2.88)* (-2.07)* 
Oil Exporter ( OIL) ------- 0.147 0.378 0.481 0.215 0.011 
  (0.02) (0.15) (2.04)* (1.98)* (1.81) 
Observations 1920 896 896 896 896 896 
Log Likelihood -875.214 -488.214 -467.485 -384.452 -467.387 -383.864 
Pseudo R-squared 0.067 0.395 0.521 0.610 0.522 0.612 
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